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 This issue of Space & Defense continues 
our effort to apply analytical tools from the field 
of political economy to emergent questions of 
defense policy.  Many of the decision points relate 
to earth orbit as befits our heritage.  Others 
expand the definition of space to include frontiers 
of conflict where new technology or novel actors 
present unresolved challenges for the United 
States and allied national security establishments. 
 
We believe contributions for this issue on 
Russia’s space sector; a prospective asteroid 
mining enterprise; criminalized power structures 
in fragile states; hypersonic weapons 
development; and the physics of financial markets 
are diverse manifestations of a single ethos.  What 
unites them is our educated hunch that national 
security competition in new spaces will involve 
mixed actors—states, international organizations, 
sub-state agencies, and non-state entities; mixed 
motives encompassing geopolitical rivalry and 
global public goods attained through cooperation; 
and mixed domains as competitors bring assets to 
bear across land, sea, air, space, and cyber. 
 
Dealing with this complexity, many of our 
analyses in Space & Defense run across four 
geopolitical chessboards—trade, finance, global 
security, and science & technology—reflecting 
late British political economist Susan Strange’s 
four structures of power.  Insightful contributions 
for our journal probe the multidimensional 
international security environment for patterns of 
political behavior that tie action and consequences 
across these chessboards.  Doing so in coherent 
ways helps policy makers tackle problems of 
deterrence and international organization for the 
21
st
 century at the frontiers of defense policy.  It 
also fulfills the charter of the U.S. Air force 
Academy’s Eisenhower Center for Space and 
Defense Studies, which posits an inherent 
connection between strengthening intellectual 
foundations of the space policy community and 
fostering learning across communities—within the 
U.S. Government and beyond—interested in 
achieving a world more peaceful, prosperous, and 
just. 
 
Our journal applauds several organizations within 
the U.S. Department of Defense that are acting 
upon a similar hunch about security challenges in 
new spaces.  The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), U.S. 
Special Operations Command (SOCOM), and U.S. 
Strategic Command (STRATCOM) among others 
are expanding their communities of interest (COI), 
initiating strategic multi-layer assessments (SMA), 
and in general finding creative ways to bridge the 
gap, a pernicious vacuum separating their policy 
responsibilities from historical scholarship and 
social science research.   
 
Space & Defense, consistent with the goals of the 
Eisenhower Center, encourages participants in 
these burgeoning transnational communities of 
interest to try their hand at one or more of the 
important questions generated by these processes.  
This particular set of problems is growing as it 
becomes more refined, right at the nexus of 
policy-relevant scholarship.     
 
 
       
     
    Damon Coletta 
    USAFA 
  `  June 2017 
Senior Leader Essay 
 
The Russian Space Sector:  
Adaptation, Retrenchment, and Stagnation 
 
Bruce McClintock 
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia focused on its public space sector and consciously chose not 
to cultivate competitive, private space companies.  Russia’s overall space enterprise is now in systemic 
crisis due to multiple factors and, despite positive rhetoric from the government and with the partial 
exception of national security space capabilities, faces yet another generation of stagnation.  
 
On October 4, 1957 the Soviet Union 
launched the first satellite into orbit from a site 
now known as Baikonur Cosmodrome.
1
  The 
Sputnik surprise launched the Space Race and 
ushered in an era of rapid advancement in 
technological and scientific developments.  Much 
has changed for both Russia and the United States 
in the last sixty years.  On March 30, 2017 a 
private U.S. company successfully launched a 
commercial satellite into orbit with a previously 
used first stage booster—a feat never before 
accomplished and one that may launch a cheaper 
era of space travel.
2
  The same day in Russia, an 
investigation into quality control issues in the 
Russian space industry reported that nearly every 
engine currently stockpiled for use in Russian 
Proton rockets is defective.
3  This investigation 
followed a catastrophic year for Russian space 
launch.  In December 2016 a Russian Progress 
resupply craft burned up in the Earth’s 
atmosphere shortly after liftoff from Baikonur, the 
                                                          
1
 Brig Gen (ret) Bruce McClintock is the CEO of 
Zenith Advisors Group and an adjunct policy analyst at 
the RAND Corporation.  Prior to retiring, he was 
special assistant to the commander of AF Space 
Command.  Until July 2016 he was the Senior Defense 
Official and U.S. Defense Attaché in the U.S. Embassy 
in Moscow, Russia. 
2
 Kenneth Chang, “SpaceX Launches a Satellite with a 
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twentieth malfunction of a Russian launcher since 
2001, marking an inauspicious end to what many 
describe as a make-or-break year for Russian 
commercial space.  Another potential indicator of 
the crisis in the Russian space sector is that last 
year Russia fell behind the United States and 
China in the number of space launches.  Russia 
finished 2016 with just 18 launches, compared to 
China's 19 and America's 20 launches.
4
   
 
The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the 
Soviet Union presented new opportunites for 
Russia to reinvent its government and economy, 
including its remarkable Soviet-era space program.  
The journey of the Russian space industry since 
the collapse of the Soviet Union offers a case 
study in how Russia, in spite of indications to do 
otherwise, chose not to break with previous 
models of behavior and organization.  In addition, 
the history indicates that, without a significant 
change in direction, the Russian space industry 
likely faces more stagnation and even further 
decline. 
 
EARLY OPTIMISM AND PUBLIC SPACE 
SUCCESSES 
 
 While the picture looks less positive now, 
in the early 1990s there was plenty of optimism 
and cooperation between Russia and the West that 
looked likely to benefit the Russian space sector.  
President Clinton reflected the optimism of the 
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time in his remarks at the U.S. Naval Academy 
graduation in 1993:  “President Yeltsin and his 
fellow reformers throughout Russia are 
courageously leading three modern Russian 
revolutions, to transform their country from a 
totalitarian state into a democracy; from a 
command economy into a market; and from an 
empire into a modern nation-state.”  Budget 
constraints, system failures (such as the 
Challenger disaster in 1986) and a desire to 
continue human space exploration futher 
motivated the United States to assist with Russian 
integration into the space enterprise supply chain. 
The signing of a bilateral trade liberalization 
treaty on commercial satellite launch services did 
pave the way for “public-public (International 
Space Station), public-private (NASA and 
Russian Space Agency subcontracting) 
cooperation, and for major private joint ventures 
between U.S. and Russian firms in the aerospace 
sector.”
5
   
 
This cooperation was most apparent in the public-
public sector.  Russia and the United States agreed 
to place U.S. astronauts on the Mir space station 
and Russian cosmonauts on the U.S. shuttle. Both 
countries agreed to an ambitious International 
Space Station (ISS) plan that made Russia a major 
partner.  The Russian Space Agency also agreed 
to provide resupply for the ISS using Soyuz-
launched Progress cargo vehicles and crew 
transportation to and from the station.
 6
  The 
zenith of the public-public cooperation for Russia 
was the eventual exclusive use of Soyuz to 
resupply and staff the ISS following the second 
shuttle accident in 2002.  Overall, the Soyuz 
System has been remarkably successful over its 
lifetime.   
 
Russia also had its own internal public sector 
space successes, independent of the international 
                                                          
5
 Jeffrey Pigman, “The New Aerospace Diplomacy: 
Reconstructing Post-Cold War U.S.-Russian Economic 
Relations,” Diplomacy and Statecraft 15(4), 2004, pp. 
683–723. 
6
 NASA, the other ISS partners, and the RSA agreed to 
incorporate major Russian contributions to the new 
space station totaling one third of the mass of the 
completed station and almost half of the volume of the 
station’s pressurized area (Pigman 2004: 703). 
community.  GLONASS, Russia’s Global 
Navigation Satellite System, is fully operational 
and an accepted international system for 
navigation and timing.  This system, originally 
designed for use by the Russian Aerospace Forces, 
has grown in popularity as a commercial system 
for public use, due in no small part to guidance 
from President Putin.  There are other examples, 
including the Public-Private Partnership between 
Gazprom Space Systems and Roscosmos. This 
operator has its own communications satellite 
constellation, providing services to both 









 The end of the Cold War accelerated an 
overall shift in U.S. space policy—inspiring the 
commercialization of space and encouraging the 
private sector to take on as much space 
development work as was commercially feasible.
8
  
From a U.S. perspective, many assumed that the 
combination of bilateral agreements and public-
public cooperation would pave the way for similar 
commercialization in the Russian space industry.  
In fact, Russia never truly intended to 
commercialize its industry.  Russia’s true intent 
was to make its space sector more competitive 




Both United States and Russian firms had to 
adjust their business models from primarily 
defense work to accommodate commercial work.  
However, Russian firms faced challenges that U.S. 
firms did not.  Most importantly, Russian firms all 
came from a Soviet model that centralized control 
                                                          
7
 Email exchange with Ivan Kosenkov, 5 December 
2016. 
8
 Pigman 2004: 700, 706.  National Space Policy 
Directive 2, issued in September 1990, actively 
promoted creation of an international marketplace in 
commercial space launch services, while still 
maintaining heavy Cold War-era restrictions on 
technology transfer and limiting U.S. Government 
satellite launches to U.S.-built launch vehicles. 
9
 Ivan Kosenkov, “Re: Questions regarding your 
article,” received by Bruce McClintock, 5 December 
2016. 
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of decision-making and resource distribution.  
Russian firms, whether fully or partially 
privatized on paper, still had to develop their 
functional autonomy as enterprises.  This legacy 
meant that, while Russian companies did gain 
market share and formed joint ventures with 
others in the United States and elsewhere, their 
companies still behaved like state-run entities. 
Arguably, this behavior was conscious and not a 
failure on the part of the companies to adapt to 
Western models. 
 
For example, International Launch Services (ILS), 
formed in 1995 as a joint venture between 
Lockheed, Khrunichev and Energia, is today a 
subsidiary of Roscosmos, the State Corporation 
for Space.  So, while Lockheed and Boeing 
currently operate United Launch Alliance as a 
truly private entity operating Atlas launchers, ILS 
operates Proton launchers as a state-owned 
monopoly in Russia.  Sea Launch provided 
another well-known example of integration 
between Boeing, the Russian firm RSC Energia 
and others. 
 
Other joint ventures occurred at the component 
level.  The most well-known is the Lockheed 
Martin selection of an Energomash RD-180 for 
use as a booster on the Atlas V.  In 2000 the RD-
180 became the first Russian-designed and built 
propulsion system on a U.S.-designed launch 
vehicle.  The RD-180 remains in use by customers, 
including the United States even though 
Energomash is also largely owned by the Russian 
government.   
 
In general, Russian firms used joint ventures to 
gain market share without truly privatizing their 
companies.  While not apparent to the West 
twenty-five years ago, it now seems clear that the 
Russian government never intended to privatize 
their industry in the same way the West did. 
 
FACTORS LEADING TO OVERALL 
DECLINE OF RUSSIA’S SPACE INDUSTRY  
 
 In the post-WWII Soviet era, the space 
sector attracted the best and brightest of Russian 
talent and significant infrastructure investment.  
Conversely, severe government funding shortages 
in the 1990s created early and long-lasting 
impacts to the Russian space sector.
10
  The lack of 
funding caused degradation to national 
constellations, infrastructure, and personnel.  
Observers visiting Russian rocket facilities in the 
1990s reported design, manufacturing, and test 
facilities in a state of decay.  Possibly more telling 
was the lack of a cadre of young professionals and 
middle managers ready to take the place of the 




The immediate impact of the reduced funding was 
delays in accomplishing new projects.  For 
example, the Russian strategy from the 1990s 
envisioned a Proton replacement, called Angara, 
which should have already been fielded.  As one 
analyst put it, “like many things in Russia’s 
history, the Angara’s path toward the market has 
not been straightforward or easy.”  In 2014, the 
Angara did have two successful test launches but 
is still years away from replacing the Proton.
12
   
 
Existing system reliability is also faltering over 
time.  Since 2001, Russia has had anomalies on 
twelve Proton and eight Soyuz launches, the most 
recent being the loss of a Progress resupply 
mission on December 1
st
, 2016.  Some of the 
launch failures have been directly attributed to 
quality control lapses.  For example, in 2009, a 
communications satellite was placed in incorrect 
orbit due to a mission software error.  In 2010, a 
Proton rocket failed because it was loaded with 
too much propellant.  In 2013, another Proton 





Besides the shock of the lack of funding in the 
1990s, the troubling trend of reduced reliability 
and slow progress on new projects is routinely 
attributed to several factors. 
 
Brain Drain—Russia’s space specialist population 
is aging, and their competence is waning due to 




 Jim Marshall, “Questions on Space and Russia,” 
received by Bruce McClintock, 5 December 2016. 
12
 Anatoly Zak, “Getting Its Space Mojo Back,” 
aerospaceamerica.aiaa.org, November 2016, 
https://aerospaceamerica.aiaa.org/features/getting-its-
space-mojo-back/.    
13
 Zak 2016.   
 McClintock / Russian Space 6 
the low attractiveness of space careers.  This is 
due in part to reportedly low pay in the space 
sector.  Also, some claim that, to comply with the 
Russian state secrets law, space workers are not 
allowed to travel outside of Russia—a big 
disincentive for young Russians. 
 
Corruption—Generally considered organic to the 
Russian economic system, corruption has become 
evident over the last few years in various aspects 
of the space sector.  The most famous example of 
corruption is the construction of the Vostochny 
Space Launch center.  Russians envisioned 
Vostochny in the 1990s as a replacement for the 
Russian reliance on Baikonur.  Over the last few 
years there have been numerous public delays 
associated with the construction of the launch 
facility and several cases of managers and 
workers arrested for corruption. Separately, in 
January 2017, Roscosmos announced it was 
withdrawing all second and third-stage engines for 
the Proton-M rocket, citing "technical reasons."  
At the same time, Russian media reported that 
factory bosses manufacturing engines for Russia's 
Proton-M rocket may have swapped precious 
metals for cheaper alternatives, possibly leading 
to the failure of the Proton in December 2016.
14  
Elsewhere, there are reports of substantial 
percentages of state budgets siphoned from major 
programs and projects as a part of “overhead.” 
 
Reduced Budgets—While Russia has improved 
upon its desultory budgets from the 1990s, this 
decade it had to reduce government funding for 
space.  As recently as 2014, Russia promised $70 
billion for a ten-year space program.  In 2016, 
struggling economically due to reduced oil prices 
and international sanctions, the government 
approved only $20.5 billion.
15
  Not only does 
reduced funding reduce or delay marquee projects 
such as lunar exploration; reduced funding further 
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 Matthew Bodner, “Grounded: Economic Crisis 




contributes to decay of the space infrastructure.
16
  
Indeed, the Russian government publicly 
acknowledged the crisis in the space industry and 
has taken actions in an attempt to reverse the slide, 




Multiple Reorganizations—Russia attempted 
several variations on organizational models for the 
space industry.  Between 2012 and 2015, Russia 
formed United Rocket and Space Corporation, 
using leaders from the Russian automobile 
industry.  URSC was granted property rights over 
space enterprise assets and separated from the 
state space agency.  Uncertainty about 
responsibility sharing and control, accompanied 
by additional delays, cancellations, and hardware 
failures, led to another reorganization in 2015.  
Effective January 1, 2016, Russia made 
Roscosmos a state corporation rather than a 
government agency.  This is a return to the 
previous model—all space industry united in one 
framework—making the policy and procurement 
decisions.  Roscosmos is now responsible for 
oversight and business development of most key 
organizations in the Russian aerospace industry, 
including Energia, Khrunichev, and Energomash.  
The Kremlin’s stated goal at the time was to make 
the industry more competitive and profit oriented.  
Most observers agree that in practice there has 
been little change in management and 
organization of such core programs as the Soyuz, 
Progress, and International Space Station. 
 
Master Plans—Russia’s latest Federal Space 
Program for 2016-2025 (FKP 2025) illuminates 
the long-term crisis faced by the Russian space 
                                                          
16
 In 2016, for example, Igor Komarov, the head of 
Roscosmos, publicly noted a “considerable lag in the 
use of modern development methods, low productivity, 
and worn machinery” (Zak 2016). 
17
 In March 2016, the Roscosomos communications 
director said, “It’s no secret that the reforms that are 
underway now might not have occurred if the state had 
not acknowledged that the Russian space industry is in 
a systemic crisis.”  Shura Collinson, “Experts Look to 
Space X Phenomenon in Quest to Develop Russia’s 




December 1, 2016. 
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sector since it is the latest plan that promises 
progress but ultimately decreases the scope of 
effort.  FKP 2025 effectively prioritizes 
preservation of Russia’s existing satellite 
constellation, consolidation and streamlining of 
the decaying space industry, and minimizing 
delays in the Russian program for lunar 
exploration.
18
   
 
Leadership Changes and Reprimands—The 
current head of Roscosmos, Igor Komarov, is the 
fourth Russian space agency director since 2009.
19
  
More recently, following the 24-hour delay of the 
inaugural launch from Vostochny, President Putin 
officially reprimanded Deputy Prime Minister 
Rogozin, Roscosmos head Komarov, and the head 
of the manufacturing firm responsible for the 
problematic component.  Leadership changes have 
done little to improve the current situation.   
 
SKOLKOVO: RECENT EFFORTS TO 
ENCOURAGE SPACE COMPANIES WITH 
SPORADIC RESULTS 
 
 One effort that has shown some signs of 
promise for helping form a true private Russian 
space sector is the Skolkovo initiative.  In 2010, 
Russian President Medvedev launched the 
Skolkovo Innovation Center, which included a 
Space and Telecommunications “cluster” among 
the five core clusters.  There is some sign of hope 
for the private sector via the Skolkovo cluster.  As 
of October 2016, there were more than 180 
participants at Skolkovo in various technological 
domains related to space activities.
20
  Skolkovo 
allows these participants to find investment, 
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 There is still some progress on the lunar base plan 
but at a much lower level.  For example, NPO 
Lavochkin intends to launch one lunar probe every 
year or two for the next seven years.  There are also 
successes such as the Radioastron mission and 
preparation of next space observatories—Spektr RG 
and Millimetron.  Kosenkov email, 5 December 2016. 
19
 Marcia Smith, “Russia Downscales Lunar Program 






 Skolkovo Space Cluster briefing, October 2016, 
courtesy of Ivan Kosenkov. 
partners, and clients on world markets.”
21
  Thus 
far, the Russian private space sector supported by 
Skolkovo can claim some modest victories.  For 
example, Dauria Aerospace won a contract in 
2012 to create two small space vehicles for 
Roscosmos.  Dauria eventually launched two 
Perseus-M microsatellites in the United States in 
2014.  Dauria is still active—working on two 
smallsats for Roscosmos and developing an earth 
observation platform named Auriga.  Other 
companies with successes include:  SPUTNIX 
(ground equipment and test facilities for small 
satellites), Spectralaser (laser ignition modules for 
Soyuz engines), Kosmokurs (a reusable suborbital 
launch vehicle for space tourism and scientific 
experiments) and Lin Industrial (family of light 
launch vehicles for small satellite launches). 
 
Still, advocates of Skolkovo acknowledge that the 
number of private space endeavors in Russia is 
relatively small and the pace of growth could be 
better.  Many blame Roscosmos for the short list 
of successes to date.  In March 2016, 
representatives from Russian private space 
companies and Roscosmos debated the level of 
cooperation between Roscosmos and private 
companies in Russia.  Only last year did 
Roscosmos say it would allow private companies 
access to the space services market, and not 
before 2020.
22
  Others report passive resistance 
from Roscosmos against private companies, for 
example, demanding detailed designs and models 
of proposed systems before discussing funding.  
This is not surprising since as a state corporation, 
Roscosmos does not have much reason to support 
private start-ups that become competitors. 
 
There are impediments to private space business 
in Russia other than Roscosmos and the systemic 
factors already listed.  Besides decreasing state 
funding, Russian firms also lack adequate private 
investment.  In addition, some point out that 
Russians, often capable of great technological 
innovation, are not as steeped in the capitalist 
                                                          
21
 Ivan Kosenkov, “Role of Skolokovo in the 
Development of the Russian Private Space Industry,” 
May 2015, IASP 2015 32
nd




 Collinson, 4 March 2016. 
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 Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
Russia focused on forming an internationally 
competitive public space sector and consciously 
chose not to establish a competitive private space 
sector.  Skolkovo’s space cluster does provide 
support for private Russian companies, but 
numerous institutional factors in the Russian 
Federation will continue to challenge space 
entrepreneurs, and Roscosmos will likely gobble 
up those that show any promise.  The one likely 
exception to this stagnation turns out to be in 
national security space capabilities. 
 
More broadly, the overall Russian space 
enterprise wallows in a systemic crisis due to 
multiple factors and, despite positive rhetoric 
from the government, likely faces yet another 
generation of stagnation and decreasing market 
share.  In the best case, which seems unlikely, 
Russia’s space industry will survive and protect 
its own systems while slowly rebuilding its once 
great national space capability.  Even under this 
best-case scenario, it would likely take a 
generation to address the many systemic issues 
facing Russia.  The worst-case scenario is a 
complete collapse of the Russian space sector 
except for military capabilities.  This also seems 
unlikely given the numerous, albeit modest, 
attempts to generate a private space sector in 
Russia and the government’s clear priority on 
national security and public organizations.  
 
The most probable path for the Russian space 
sector is enduring stagnation with the odd success 
outside of critical national security missions, but 
nothing akin to its former glory.  Sadly, following 
twenty-five years of opportunity, Russia space is a 
poster child for how not to evolve for the next 
century of space challenges. 
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Legislating for Humanity’s Next Step: Cultivating a Legal Framework 
for the Mining of Celestial Bodies 
 
Joseph Crombie 
Rapid expansion in the space sector by state and private sector actors highlights the need for a new legal 
regulatory framework, particularly regarding property rights.  The exploitation of space-based resources 
through the mining of asteroids is currently subject to a cold-war era international agreement that did 
not include clear consideration about how future off-world commercial exploitation might be regulated 
or property rights assigned. This article explores two empirical examples, the International Seabed 
Authority and the International Telecommunication Union, to determine whether they provide useful 
models of a future international legal framework for off-world property rights. 
 
  
Exploration and exploitation of resources 
are central themes for Homo sapiens. The history 
of mankind is littered with examples of great 
distances and heroic challenges overcome in the 
face of adversity. After years of steadfast growth, 
the space industry now appears on the cusp of a 
new era of rapid expansion in its capabilities and 
its users (Space Report 2015; Sommariva 2014). 
Using the in situ resources of outer space, 
commercial enterprise hopes to replicate the 
private economic growth experienced when new 
frontiers were explored and developed on earth. 
To allow this to happen, an updated legal 
framework is needed to reflect technical 
developments and ambitions in the contemporary 
space industry and, which allows, in particular, for 
property rights to be assigned on celestial bodies, 
permitting their mining and utilization.  
 
The central research objective of this article is to 
examine those ambiguities concerning property 
rights as they relate to celestial bodies. The 
analysis is exploratory, highlighting advantages 
and challenges of the empirical examples studied. 
The first section, below, explores the current legal 
framework for space activities. The second 
section details the United Nations role in 
international cooperation on space. The third and 
fourth sections respectively analyze existing 
models of intergovernmental administration 
namely, the International Seabed Authority and 
the International Telecommunications Union, 
providing an informed understanding of what a 
future legal property rights framework for 
celestial bodies might include, and what it might 
not. Consideration is also given to how property 
rights on celestial bodies might be governed.  
 
CURRENT LEGAL FRAMEWORK 
GOVERNING SPACE ACTIVITY 
 
Four international treaties have come into 
existence through United Nations (UN) 
resolutions that condition public and private 
activity in space. International agreements are 
vital to global commerce because private 
companies will be less likely to risk their capital 
without widely shared legal assurances and a 
regime of mutually recognizing contractual 
obligations. The first and most significant 
agreement is the 1967 Outer Space Treaty (OST) 
(UNOOSA 1967). The OST is the focal point of 
space law and considers the exploitation and use 
of outer space as the “province of all mankind” 
(UNOOSA 1967: 3). This guarantees the freedom 
of access to space for all states, outlaws national 
appropriation and the placement of nuclear 
weapons, forbids military uses of celestial bodies, 
and sets out a state’s duties and liabilities relevant 
to its domestic space activity (Johannsson et al. 
2015). In regard to the OST forbidding military 
uses of outer space, it should be noted that this is 
specific to outlawing all weapons testing, military 
maneuvers and the creation of military 
installations only (UNOOSA 1967).  
 
The Rescue Agreement of 1968 was designed to 
give astronauts any assistance they required in 
distress, obliging states that they “shall 
immediately take all possible steps to rescue them 
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and render them all necessary assistance” 
(UNOOSA 1968: 6). The agreement also 
mandated states to provide assistance to a launch 
state in recovering space objects that returned to 
earth outside of their territory. 
 
The Liability Convention of 1972 identified that a 
space object causing damage or loss to human life 
would be the responsibility of the launching state: 
“a launching state shall be absolutely liable to pay 
compensation for damage caused by its space 
object on the surface of the earth or to aircraft 
flight” (UNOOSA 1972: Article 1).   
 
Finally, the Registration Convention of 1975 was 
intentioned to provide a mechanism to assist states 
in the identification of space objects. The 
agreement created a registry of all objects sent 
into space, maintained by the Secretary General 
and available to all (UNOOSA 1975).   
 
A fifth treaty, the 1979 Moon Agreement, was not 
ratified by any major spacefaring state (Gangale 
2009). Christol (1982) argues the primary flaw of 
the Moon treaty was its inclusion of the Common 
Heritage of Mankind (CHM) principle. This was 
an extension to a celestial body of the Province of 
Mankind principle within the OST. Hoffstadt 
(1994) contends that CHM caused disagreement 
because it was perceived by states as ambiguous, 
and Pop (2009) alleges it was connected to the 
‘New International Economic Order’ favoring 
developing countries that was shunned by 
developed states.  
 
THE OUTER SPACE TREATY AND THE 
DEBATE ABOUT PROPERY RIGHTS 
 
A crucial obstacle facing the 
commercialization of outer space and 
manifestation of private sector ambition is the 
issue of property rights; these cannot be assigned 
currently because to insinuate a state has 
sovereignty over what is being claimed violates 
the OST’s non-appropriation principle. As 
Gleeson (2007) notes, international laws apply to 
states rather than individual entities, placing the 
responsibility upon the state to enforce entities 
operating on its territory or on its behalf to 
conform to international legal obligations. This 
places the state accountable for the licensing, 
authorization and ongoing supervision of its 
national space activities. 
 
The establishment of property rights within a legal 
framework is essential to creating an optimal 
environment for the development of private sector 
led economic activity in outer space (Johannsson 
et al, 2015; Tronchetti, 2014). Jakhu & Buzdugan 
(2008) argue that clarifying issues surrounding 
right of way, spectrum rights, intellectual property, 
mineral rights, and title deeds are necessary first 
steps but cannot be undertaken under the current 
legal apparatus. For private companies to extract 
lucrative resources from asteroids or the moon, 
they would expect to establish property rights to 
protect their ownership of the minerals they mine.  
 
Widely shared legal norms would likely need to 
be a starting point for many commercial business 
plans. Article 2 of the OST expressly forbids the 
national appropriation of celestial bodies via 
claims of sovereignty, use or occupation or any 
other means (UNOOSA 1967). But contradicting 
arguments exist over whether a ban on national 
appropriation extends to a ban on individual 
appropriation, as will now be examined.   
 
While the national appropriation of celestial 
bodies is explicitly forbidden within the OST, the 
appropriation by individual means is not explicitly 
outlawed. Gorove (1968) argues as the dominant 
proponent of a minority of authors that “the 
[Outer Space] Treaty in its present form appears 
to contain no prohibition regarding individual 
appropriation” (1968: 42) although the generally 
accepted view is that private appropriation and 
property rights are not allowed under the OST 
(O’Donnell & Goldman 1997). A principal reason 
articulated by Sterns et al. (1996) is that states are 
not able to license for private appropriation that 
“which cannot be appropriated publicly” (1996: 
53).  
 
Pop (2000) argues that even if a property claim is 
made it would be unenforceable because to 
recognize the property claim would be implying 
national sovereignty over the territory in question 
and would constitute national appropriation. 
Indeed, even before the creation of the OST, Jenks 
(1965) argued that “states bear international 
responsibility for national activities in space; it 
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follows that what is forbidden to a state is not 
permitted to a chartered company created by a 
state or to one of its nationals acting as a private 
adventurer” (1965: 201). Academic literature 
overtly favors the argument that private 
appropriation is outlawed on celestial bodies. 
Consequently, Lambright (2003) argues that 
property rights cannot be claimed by prospective 
private mining firms on celestial bodies under the 
existing legal framework.   
 
Some legal commentators have questioned 
whether asteroids should be defined as celestial 
bodies or “whether they should be seen instead as 
chattel because they are moveable property” 
(Feinman 2014: 220). In support of this, Tingkang 
(2012) argues that while it is not feasible to move 
a planet or a moon, an asteroid can be captured 
and its path altered, and this reclassification would 
allow for property rights to be claimed and the 
extraction of resources outside the legal umbrella 
of the OST. However, this change in definition 
would not address issues such as how different 
pieces of a chattel would be claimed, underscoring 
the need for a new legal framework and not 
simply a reinterpretation of the existing one. The 
traditional role of international law is to clarify 
and regularize state behavior (Leib, 2015). Thus, 
the ambiguity created under the OST highlights 
that it is lacking in its key purpose and a new 
framework is required. 
 
CONTEMPORARY DEVELOPMENTS 
SHAPING THE SPACE SECTOR 
 
Space policy has previously been 
manifested through international politics and state 
rivalries in the form of prestige projects and the 
substantial growth in the number of military and 
civilian satellites. But the rapid growth of private-
sector enterprise has drastically altered the 
dynamics of space policy. Since the birth of the 
space age, the principal and predominantly only 
players in the space arena have been major space 
powers such as the United States and Russia.  
 
States committed significant investment of public 
money into space exploration to gain prestige, 
security, and for strategic competition with fellow 
states (Leib, 2015). While these rationales are 
decidedly present among state motivations today, 
the revolution in the private sector’s role has been 
driven by political and economic trends “towards 
privatization, commercialization, deregulation, 
and globalization of almost all human activities” 
(Jakhu & Buzdugan 2008: 205). 
   
The private sector space industry has burgeoned 
considerably by the prospect of exploiting what 
are perceived, rightly or wrongly, as the virtually 
limitless mineral resources located within celestial 
bodies. This sector exists alongside and as part of 
other commercial space players investing in 
communications, imagery, and launch services. 
 
The advancement of analyzing asteroid geology 
using spectroscopic analysis has allowed for the 
identification of resources contained within near-
earth asteroids (Sommariva 2015), with the 
recognition of valuable elements such as platinum 
group metals, gold, and many others in 
gargantuan quantities (Lladó et al. 2014). The 
Earth’s moon has been identified as having large 
quantities of Helium 3, an element relatively 
scarce on Earth and vital for future nuclear fusion 
development (D’Souza et al. 2006). The largest 
companies are all based in the United States 
(O’Neill 2015) suggesting an advantage to 
technologically advanced economies that have the 
ability to conduct speculative research. 
  
When the OST was negotiated there was no 
consideration of the technologies that would 
become commonplace in the future or the growth 
in the private sector. The size of the space 
industry has seen steady growth, to $330 billion in 
2014, of which 76% was made up of commercial 
space activities (The Space Report 2015). 
Between 1996 and 2006, satellite manufacturing 
within the United States achieved annual growth 
levels of 11%, while the rest of the world 
achieved around 13% (Anderson 2015). Garretson 
(2008) notes that the number of spacefaring 
nations will increase as costs are driven down and 
private operators offer cost effective options to 
developing states.  
 
Garretson (2008) believes the increase in space 
actors will lead to a higher probability of 
accidents, problems, and unnecessary tensions 
that could be avoided through an up-to-date 
strategy to manage and further develop space. As 
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space increasingly becomes a strategic “center of 
gravity” (Gleeson 2007: 146) for many within the 
international community, it is important that fresh 
changes are brought about to address how states 
and their entities safeguard their interests within 
space. Sommariva (2014) argues that efforts 
should be made to enlarge the discussion to create 
an informed public debate on a matter that affects 
the lives of everyone on earth.  
 
The United States has historically enjoyed a 
global leadership position in regard to space 
activities (Cremins & Spudis 2007), meaning it 
can exert strong influence on the processes 
characterizing space activity. In 2014 a bill was 
introduced to Congress that later went on to 
become the U.S. Commercial Space Launch 
Competitiveness Act (Congress 2016). The core 
of the bill was a provision that recognizes U.S. 
commercial asteroid resource companies’ property 
rights over the resources they extract. Tronchetti 
(2014) argues that while the bill is not intended to 
extend American ownership over asteroids, this 
could be its legal effect. Tronchetti (2014) further 
argues that the Act goes against principles created 
by the OST and amounts to an attempted 
amendment of the treaty.  
 
The United States is not the only country to have 
developed such legislation. Luxembourg 
announced that it would “seek to jump-start an 
industrial sector to mine asteroid resources in 
space by creating regulatory and financial 
incentives” (Selding 2016:1). The emergence of 
independent domestic legislation further 
showcases the failure of the OST in not allowing 
states to facilitate their own private sector growth 
within the terms of the treaty.  
 
When the OST was created, Feinmen (2014) 
argues that it was positively received by the 
international community. But the creation of 
independent domestic legislation by states party to 
the OST shows overt dissatisfaction with it in a 
modern context. Many authors such as 
Johannsson et al. (2015), Tronchetti (2014), and 
Hertzfeld & von der Dunk (2005) argue for the 
creation of a new international framework. The 
academic debate on this matter shows an 
inclination to argue that property rights cannot be 
claimed under the OST, and multiple efforts to 
reinterpret its specifics highlight an aspect of law 
that is now out of touch with reality. 
 
THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS 
 
Since its inception in 1945, the United 
Nations (UN) has been a key player in 
international affairs. As Urquhart (1993) identifies, 
following processes of decolonization and the 
internationally paralyzing nature of the Cold War, 
the UN became the arena for mediation and 
conciliation among the world’s states, aiming to 
maintain and promote international peace and 
security.  
 
Perez de Cuellar (1989), the UN’s fifth Secretary 
General, serving 1982-1991, argued that “the 
United Nations has been a witness, a catalyst and 
an agent of a massive transition in global affairs” 
(1989: 1). Its importance to, and central role in, 
effecting global cooperation cannot be understated. 
The values and norms that shape international 
institutions and state sovereignty are constantly 
subject to change as global society adapts to new 
developments (Makinda 1998), but this has an 
impact on how the UN is perceived, its influence, 
and how effectively it can operate.  
 
White (2008) describes a tension at the core of the 
UN as angst regarding loss of sovereignty that is 
assumed by international cooperation. Makinda 
(1998) argues that there is a perception among 
states that the UN erodes the authority of its 
individual member states. So even though the UN 
and other international organizations such as the 
World Bank and World Trade Organization have 
proliferated since the end of World War II, 
suggesting acceptance by states of their validity as 
international players, their increase in powers is 
often associated with alarm among domestic 
policy makers who feel their sovereignty is being 
threatened (White 2008). Nevertheless, the UN’s 
experience in international dialogue means that it 
plays a crucial role in determining the sovereign 
expectations a state should have.  
 
The agenda of the UN is set by the intentions and 
aims of its members and is subject to a wide array 
of differing motives, with the most powerful 
member states able to table more coercive ideas 
successfully. Historically, the attempted passage 
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of space legislation that contravenes the interests 
of the space powers such as the United States or 
Russia has been ignored. For example, the 1976 
Bogotá declaration, signed by several states on the 
Equator, attempted to assert sovereignty over their 
respective portions of favorable geosynchronous 
orbit, but it was widely ignored by more powerful 
states.  
 
The Bogotá declaration, and the aforementioned 
Moon Treaty, did not serve the interests of the 
major space powers and were consequently 
disregarded. It is clear that international space 
legislation will not become universally recognized 
or implemented unless it is supported by the 
hegemonic space powers such as the United States 
or Russia. Overall, it is reasonable to assume that 
any future agreement concerning the property 
rights of celestial bodies must have the support of 
the key actors if it is to be implemented 
universally and successfully.   
 
There is precedent for international agreement 
concerning space to be created outside of the UN. 
Hertzfeld and von der Dunk (2005) highlight the 
case of the International Space Station (ISS), 
which allows participating states to classify each 
module of the space station associated to them as 
“quasi territory” (2005: 88). The agreement 
between the participant states of the ISS allows 
for seamless travel for its resident astronauts 
between modules contributed by numerous states 
and as Leib (2015) notes allowed states to retain 
jurisdiction including criminal jurisdiction over 
their citizens who are in the ISS. But this is a 
confined agreement with little validity as a 
template for circumstances outside of and beyond 
the confines of the ISS.  
 
The UN is the principal international body for 
cooperation and the maintenance of peace, but the 
reality is arguably more complex because the role 
of the hegemonic powers is key to how future 
dialogue will be shaped. Sommariva (2015) 
maintains that it is vital the United States remain 
open to cooperation with other states in creating 
an international legal and institutional framework 
for the advancement of the space economy. The 
role of the United States within the United 
Nations will be critical, but this opportunity 
comes at a time when the UN has been relegated 
to one of the country’s “fair weather friends” 
(Mingst 2003: 82). The desire to maintain the full 
range of sovereign options along with the 
dominant role of hegemonic influence within the 
UN and its space agreements are factors for 
consideration when forecasting the nature of 
future governance, including property rights on 
celestial bodies.   
 
THE INTERNATIONAL SEABED 
AUTHORITY (ISA): AN IDEOLOGICALLY 
CONTENTIOUS AGENCY IN ITS INFANCY 
 
The International Seabed Authority (ISA) 
was created in 1994 following international 
recognition of the need for a supranational form of 
governance of areas outside traditional zones of 
state sovereignty, after entry into force of the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS). While it is closely aligned with the 
United Nations (UN) hierarchy, it is an 
autonomous international organization (Wood 
2008). Nandan (2006) states that the ISA was 
established to provide vital protection to investors 
by giving them exclusive rights over seabed areas 
through ISA contracts or licenses.   
 
This section analyses the ISA model for its 
applicability and relevance to any future model 
concerning or regulating the property rights of 
celestial bodies. The ISA’s principle role is that of 
supranational administration over mining 
activities beyond sovereign jurisdiction, so 
immediate parallels can be drawn with a potential 
future body to protect the interests of businesses 
planning to mine celestial bodies. Indeed, 
Johannsson et al. (2015) argues that the 
operational structure of the ISA could provide “a 
viable model for overseeing asteroid mining 
activities” (2015: 181). But the ideological 
foundation of the ISA, namely the principle of 
“Common Heritage,” will be discussed and 
reviewed for the likely impediment that it might 
cause in future inter-state dialogues or agreements 
given contemporary political contexts.  
 
The establishment of the ISA provided a new 
legal framework in which the seabed is owned as 
property for all mankind; its ownership and 
utilization existed outside of the Westphalian state 
legal system (Brearley 2006). Part XI of 
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UNCLOS, adopted by UNCLOS III in 1982, was 
the largest part of the convention, the most 
contentiously negotiated, and the most relevant to 
the deep seabed-mining regime, laying the 
foundation for the ISA (Lodge 2002).  
 
The ISA was established on 16 November 1994 to 
implement the UNCLOS agreement for the “Area,” 
meaning the “seabed and ocean floor and subsoil 
thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction” 
(UNCLOS Article 1: 1; Lodge 2002). The ISA 
remit also included the power to regulate and 
protect marine ecosystems, coastlines, and the 
marine environment from hazards and pollution 
(Chircop 2011). The activities in the Area were 
described as “all activities of exploration for, and 
exploitation of, the resources of the Area” 
(UNCLOS Article 1: 3). This means the role of 
the ISA was the “organization through which 
States Parties shall organize and control activities 
in the Area, particularly with a view to 
administering the resources of the Area” 
(UNCLOS Article 157: 1). 
   
The ISA comprises three bodies: the assembly, 
which is the supreme body, and the one to which 
the other two bodies—the council, and the legal 
and technical commission—are accountable 
(Lodge 2002). The three ISA bodies operate 
through consensus with decisions taken on a 
practical and technical basis; this is in contrast to 
the ideological concerns that marked the initial 
negotiation of UNCLOS during the cold war 
(Wood 2008).   
 
Ultimately, the ISA’s primary function is to 
regulate deep-sea mining, which is mining taking 
place outside of the 200 nautical mile exclusive 
economic zone of states (Glasby 2002). The 
activities that it can regulate include “drilling; 
dredging; excavation; waste disposal; and 
construction and operation or maintenance of 
installations, pipelines, and other devices related 
to such activities” (UNCLOS Article 157: 1). It 
should be noted that the ISA does not have 
jurisdiction over the seabed as a whole. For 
example, as Brearley (2006) notes, under   
UNCLOS III, states can lay cables and pipelines 
on the seabed without the consent of the ISA. 
The need for the ISA as a governing body was 
driven by projections of abundant resources on the 
sea bed, similar to the profuse projected resources 
from off-world mining. J. L. Mero in Mineral 
Resources of the Sea (1965) set prospectors’ 
pulses racing by describing a virtually 
inexhaustible supply of nickel, copper, cobalt, and 
manganese on the floor of the Pacific Ocean. 
Many of these undersea prospectors saw the ocean 
floor in much the same way as those who claim 
the existence of huge reserves and profitable 
opportunities for economic exploitation of scarce 
and valuable minerals on celestial bodies.   
 
Yet, despite UNCLOS and what Brewer (1985) 
argues was the openness of financiers to the 
extraordinary conditions surrounding deep sea 
mining, the reality of seabed mining seems less 
likely than ever. Lodge (2002) argues that 
commercial interest in seabed mining has 
dwindled to the point where it has now become a 
remote possibility, and Broadus (1987) contends 
that the reserves of nickel, copper, cobalt, and 
manganese, the principal metals that would be 
mined on the seabed, are more than adequately 
served by land-based supplies for the foreseeable 
long term. Deep sea mining has thus not begun in 
any viable sense. In the absence of commercial 
interest in deep seabed mineral resources, the role 
of the ISA has been modest (Keyuan 2010). This 
also limits the opportunity to analyze examples 
that could be applied to any possible model for 
exploiting celestial bodies.   
 
While commercial prospects for future deep sea 
mining appear slim in the immediate term, the 
ISA has approved plans for exploration and has 
entered into 15-year agreements with twenty-six 
contractors (International Seabed Authority 2017). 
The authority itself is also authorized to conduct 
its own mining operations and has full legal 
personality along with legal immunity (Chircop 
2011). The ISA can also contract with private and 
national companies as long as it is awarded a site 
of equal size or value (Nagender Nath & Sharma 
2000).   
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THE COMMON HERITAGE PRINCIPLE 
 
What makes the ISA exceptional in regard 
to international bodies is that its work is guided by 
the principle of the “Common Heritage of 
Mankind” (CHM). CHM means that the rights and 
resources in the area belong to mankind as a 
whole and are exercised by the ISA on behalf of 
mankind (Yu & Ji-Lu 2011). CHM is a 
fundamental principle in the new customary law 
of the sea arising from UNCLOS (Lihai 1993).  
 
However, a lack of clarity still exists concerning 
the CHM principle; there are though, commonly 
agreed features that include “the area is not 
subject to national sovereignty; all states are to 
share in the management of the area; benefits 
from the area are to be distributed evenly; the area 
is to be used exclusively for peaceful purposes” 
(Brearley 2006: 51).   
 
Authors such as Glasby (1986) argue that the 
CHM principle was contentious and caused 
disagreement among many states. The United 
States, in particular, found fault with the CHM 
principle, and the Reagan administration criticized 
UNCLOS for accepting CHM as a conventional 
principle of international law. The administration 
also saw the ISA as complex and unnecessary 
bureaucracy, while Joyner (1996) argues that 
American concern over CHM was motivated by 
the potential for what it perceived as international 
socialism to be applied to celestial bodies at a 
later date. Consequently, the United States did not, 
and so far has not, ratified UNCLOS and is not a 
member of the ISA. 
  
It is clear that the CHM principle has created 
division and hindered consensus in regard to 
international agreements. This was plainly 
illustrated with the Moon Agreement of 1984 
where the inclusion of CHM is blamed by Leib 
(2015) for creating contention and ultimately 
playing a key part in the low acceptance rate by 
states. Although UNCLOS and the Moon 
Agreement are not directly comparable, both 
regimes do share similarities because each was 
designed to implement the concept of CHM.   
 
In examining the ISA much insight is provided to 
inform a potential model of a celestial body 
resource authority. But if the ISA’s key 
ideological foundation, CHM, has been rejected in 
treaties covering space, including the Moon 
agreement, this inevitably raises questions over 
whether it can be applied beyond the ISA. States 
party to the Moon Agreement haven’t even begun 
discussions to create the contemplated 
international regime it would involve, illustrating 
its signatories lack of will to fully enact the treaty. 
While there is much in the ISA model which 
might be relevant to mining on celestial bodies, 
incorporating the CHM principle seems certain to 
cause unease if it is included in future agreements. 
CHM assigns key preconditions to any possible 
ownership solutions which could detrimentally 
influence the success of any agreement on 
celestial body property rights.   
 
A particularly unique aspect of the ISA’s model, 
but a potential problem if applied to off-world 
mining, is the way in which it distributes the 
revenue it derives from its range of activities. The 
ISA is required to use the revenues gained to 
cover (in order of priority), “administrative 
expenses; equitable distribution between states… 
with special attention… to the needs of 
developing countries; funds for the Enterprise; 
and compensating states affected by market 
changes due to activities in the Area” (Brearly 
2006: 53).   
 
These arrangements illustrate the ISA’s 
inclination towards practicing social justice. The 
commitment of the ISA to addressing the needs of 
developing states applies positive discrimination 
within the international system. However, this 
would arguably be unpopular if applied to the 
space context, considering the vast costs to states 
and private actors associated with accessing and 
retrieving mineral resources. The ISA is 
undoubtedly ambitious in its redistributive remit, 
but this ambition hinders its applicability, in the 
modern political context, to acting as a template 
for an organization administering the property 
rights of celestial bodies.   
 
The ISA is an organization in its relatively early 
stages and the practical application of its role has 
been limited so far, but it undoubtedly has great 
potential as an organization administering the 
huge quantities of mineral wealth that are claimed 
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to lie beneath our oceans. Nandan (2006) argues 
that since its inception the ISA has established 
itself as a reliable global institution despite being 
a modest-sized operation. The powers of 
commercialization have not challenged the 
ideological status quo of the deep sea bed regime 
because it has not been commercially viable to 
mine these areas. But the ISA’s moral principles, 
if applied to space, may become challenged when 
subjected to the pressures and expectations of 
enterprise. Any legal regime developed for 
property rights on celestial bodies will no doubt 
be conditioned by the dispute surrounding the 
CHM principle, which is likely to be a significant 




AN EFFECTIVE, IF LACKLUSTER, 
INSTITUTION 
 
This section analyses how successfully 
the International Telecommunications Union 
(ITU) engages with and accomplishes its role of 
administering the most important activity in the 
contemporary space sector: the allocation of radio 
frequencies and slots in the geostationary orbit 
(GEO). The ITU’s merits and flaws are critiqued 
to give an informed perspective on whether it can 
be a template for creating an international 
agreement governing the legal framework of 
property rights on celestial bodies.  
 
The International Telecommunications Union 
(ITU) was created in 1932 following the merger 
of the International Telegraph Union, established 
in 1885, with the signatories to the International 
Radio Telegraph Convention of 1906 (Cowhey, 
1999). The International Telegraph Union was 
established as part of an agreement between 
twenty European states that allowed for 
interoperability between international telegraph 
networks (Zacher 2002). The primary motive 
behind the establishment of the International 
Telegraph Union, and later the ITU, was the need 
to guarantee the continuous function of 
communication across borders. While initially 
only operating in Western Europe, overarching 
standards covering costs and payment 
mechanisms allowed for international standards to 
be set (Shahin 2011).   
The ITU is one of the oldest functional purpose 
international organizations in the world. It is 
guided by voluntary agreements and became a 
specialized United Nations (UN) agency in 1947 
(Wallenstein 1977). The administrative and 
diplomatic aspects of the ITU’s work are 
discussed by its member states at plenipotentiary 
conferences held once every four years. This gives 
direction to the administrative and policy support 
work for the institution and its eight hundred 
Geneva-based staff (Shahin 2011).  
 
The ITU serves to facilitate the seamless 
communication of information within and across 
borders. The period preceding the establishment 
of common standards and a guiding international 
body was rife with restricted communication 
networks that would stop at borders due to 
incompatibility (Shahin 2011). This scenario 
extrapolates to one where states offer differing 
methods of recognizing celestial body property 
rights that are not mutually honored, creating 
difficult market conditions for all actors.   
 
It has been discussed how domestic legislation, 
such as by the United States in its Space Act of 
2015, set domestic standards that may not 
correlate with the domestic legislation of other 
states, creating potentially competing standards. 
While it is uncommon for the sovereign priorities 
of states and the internal legal processes of two 
states to be identical, a certain degree of 
harmonization is crucial. If left alone, this would 
inevitably have the effect of restricting the 
development of off-world resource mining, as 
differing standards would be likely to inhibit 
market growth. Many authors argue that the 
globalization of telecommunications networks and 
introduction of common standards has enhanced 
international cooperation and enabled 
international telecommunications to flourish 
(Cowhey 1999; Krasner 1991; Ruggie 1975). It is, 
therefore, reasonable to argue that international 
cooperation would flourish in a similar manner 
following the introduction of common standards 
for off-world property rights.   
 
Parallels can be drawn between motivations for 
creating seamless function and the setting of 
universal standards that created the ITU on the 
one hand, and factors now providing momentum 
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to create an international agreement on the 
property rights of celestial bodies allowing for 
their exploitation. International agreement can 
create overarching standards. These govern how 
international and domestic companies offer their 
goods on a global market and the environment 
within which private and public actors in states 
would operate. Just like the establishment of the 
ITU, these are national issues that require 
international agreement.  
 
The role the ITU currently plays directly in the 
space arena is the allocation of radio frequencies 
and satellite orbital slot positions in geostationary 
orbit. This is within the ITU’s mandate because 
satellites allow for the optimal expansion of 
telecommunications services, both nationally and 
globally (Jakhu 2007). The largest sector of the 
space industry is currently telecommunication 
services, characterized by continual expansion and 
innovation, and worth over $195 billion (Satellite 
Industry Association 2014). The ITU thus 
oversees the largest area of the contemporary 
space sector.  
 
Radio frequencies and orbital positions are a 
scarce resource. Indeed, since 1973 the ITU has 
described them as a “limited natural resource and 
that they must be used rationally, efficiently and 
economically” (ITU 2011: 42). Only a finite 
number of frequency bands and orbital slots can 
be allocated without potential harmful 
interference between them. Of course, while radio 
frequencies or satellite orbital slots cannot be 
depleted in the same way as fish reserves or 
minerals, their stock is finite, and this engenders 
competition for the best slots and frequencies. The 
importance of the ITU is highlighted by the fact 
that there are over 1,419 satellites currently 
orbiting Earth (Union of Concerned Scientists 
2017), with each satellite registered with the ITU 
given a unique orbital position and radio 
frequency.   
 
Using the ITU as a model or template for 
establishing property rights in space is therefore 
limited by the fact that it currently administers 
activity for a relatively narrow aspect of space 
utilization. The ITU does serve as a functional 
example of what can be achieved through 
international cooperation, but it must be 
acknowledged that the area within which it 
operates is constrained. A future agreement 
concerning property rights on celestial bodies 
would need to be more than a direct copy of the 
ITU’s framework because it will apply to a far 
different and wider arena.    
 
The flexibility that the ITU provides through its 
operational mandate given directly by member 
states has, however, led to criticism that it has no 
enforcement mechanisms. The ITU is made up of 
member states and has no power to enforce its 
own regulations over its members. The 
organization also has no mandate to settle disputes 
between members and expects that all states 
should cooperate to find solutions (Jakhu 2007).  
 
This has led to criticism that the ITU is incapable 
of carrying out its own responsibilities. Cowhey 
(1999) argues that the ITU has traditionally been 
characterized as simply a set of technical rules 
eliciting minimal commitment by its members. 
Rendleman (2010) concurs that the ITU has been 
dismissed as a “gentlemen’s club” because it is 
too reliant on the goodwill of its members while 
Harrison (2013) contends that historically the ITU 
has acted as an expensive and exclusive club, 
leading to the maintenance of high standards only 
because the members had an interest in 
maintaining decorum. This interest is critical to 
international agreements, but whether a similar 
concern would exist in regulating space resources 
outside of telecommunication interests can only 
be speculation.  
 
The lowering of entry costs to the space arena has 
allowed for new actors, and this has put pressure 
on the ITU. Indeed, the ITU complains that 
universities and others are launching satellites into 
orbit without registering them with their relevant 
national body, and it has no means to sanction the 
state within which the offending organization is 
based (Harrison 2013). This is evidence of the 
problem facing organizations like the ITU that 
many states will not readily agree to activities that 
involve the transfer of their jurisdictional control 
to an international body. Ceding jurisdiction to an 
international body will only be accomplished if 
there is a significant benefit to the state. 
The ITU’s practice of allocating radio spectrum 
and orbital slots on a first come, first served basis 
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has also led to criticism. A state notifies the ITU 
of its intention to start a service using certain 
radio frequencies from a particular orbital position 
and is then protected against damaging 
interference from late comers (Lyall & Larson 
2016). States seek to gain radio frequencies and 
orbital positions as they deem appropriate for 
enhancing their national interest, disregarding the 
scarcity the ITU bemoans (Jakhu 2007).  
 
ASCENDENCY OF NEOLIBERALISM 
 
The adoption of neoliberal principles 
denotes a marked shift from state-centric to 
market-oriented views of communications among 
the major spacefaring countries. While there are 
competing definitions of neoliberalism, for the 
purpose of this article it is assumed to mean 
political principles and economic activities 
grounded in the belief that markets should be 
privatized to serve the public good. The ITU is an 
influential and leading actor in the governance of 
contemporary space-based activity; its policies 
directly affect the ways in which space activity is 
conducted.  
 
Escobar (1995) argued that its decisions were 
based disproportionately on the opinions of those 
in power and that “our knowledge is ideological in 
the sense that international organisations' 
conceptions and means of description represent 
the world as it is for those who rule it, rather than 
for those who are ruled” (1995: 108). In the 
context of globalization, such a view does not 
appear out of date today, and as Cowhey (1999) 
also noted, presciently, it was also necessary to 
acknowledge increasing precedent for free trade 
rules and the liberalization of the world economy 
(Cowhey, 1999).   
 
McCormick (2008) argues that the precedent has 
manifested itself through the space 
telecommunications sector, with the privatization 
and restructuring of two of the world’s biggest 
intergovernmental satellite organizations, Intelsat 
and Inmarsat. The privatization of Intelsat and 
Inmarsat represents creeping marketization of the 
global commons in line with dominant elite ideas 
concerning the supremacy of neoliberal principles. 
Creation of a legal regime for the property rights 
of celestial bodies will most likely put emphasis 
on the role of private interests, on the basis that 
governments tend to see them as essential for 
driving economic development. The supremacy of 
neoliberal principles and the dominance of ideas 
favoring privatization suggest that a model for 
celestial body property rights based on the ITU 
would need to favor private interests.  
 
The evolving nature of telecommunications and 
the emergence of the ITU as a key actor in the 
contemporary space arena has resulted in what 
Shahin (2011) argues is the flexible nature of its 
mandate. The ITU does have clear merit in that it 
is a functional body, but it also has weaknesses. 
Its lack of an enforcement mechanism means it 
can be held hostage to the goodwill of its 
members. Crucial for any future institution 
governing the property rights of celestial bodies 
would be whether it had the enforcement 
mechanisms to ensure the implementation of its 




This article has used empirical examples 
to examine what a future legal framework 
governing the property rights of celestial bodies 
might include. Private enterprises are setting their 
sights on exploiting what they foresee as limitless 
space-based resources. In order for this to happen 
an internationally recognized and agreed legal 
framework for allocating property rights has to be 
determined for mining on celestial bodies such as 
asteroids. The ambitions of private enterprise have 
put increasing pressure on policy makers to create 
international treaties that facilitate the 
appropriation of celestial bodies’ resources 
through the establishment of property rights.   
 
The most significant existing treaty, the 1967 
Outer Space Treaty (OST), guarantees the 
freedom of space to all states and is widely held 
not to allow appropriation by private or public 
actors. Hence, those seeking to mine celestial 
bodies cannot claim property rights under the 
current legal framework. State or private 
enterprises are unlikely to risk investment when 
there is no regime of mutually respecting 
contractual obligations and no legal basis giving 
them property title to anything they mine.   
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There is disagreement on whether the OST 
explicitly prohibits individual or private 
appropriation because the treaty does not provide 
clarity on the status of the resources contained in 
celestial bodies, in particular their exploitation 
and commercial utilization (Leib 2015; 
McCormick 2015; Hertzfeld & von der Dunk 
2005).  
 
However, much scholarly literature, legal 
commentators, and policy makers favor the 
argument that the OST does outlaw individual 
appropriation. Some have suggested 
circumventing this lack of clarity by classifying 
asteroids as chattel (Feinman 2014) or applying 
the accepted definition of “commercial use” 
within the OST from “use,” which could allow 
mining (Hobe & Schrogl 2009).  
 
To eliminate such ambiguity, it can be argued that 
only the establishment of a new legal framework 
creating a clear and unambiguous property rights 
regime can create the right conditions for private 
sector led economic activity in outer space 
(Johannsson 2015; Tronchetti 2014; Sommariva 
2015). As space becomes an increasingly busy 
arena through growing private involvement, it is 
vital that international law adapts to contemporary 
realities without simply seeking to reinterpret the 
OST, whose principle purpose originally was 
demilitarization (Hickman 2010). 
 
Since its establishment, the United Nations has 
been a vital actor in mediating and facilitating 
peace around the world. While the organization 
has strong historical precedent for mediation, it 
suffers from tension among its members regarding 
a loss of sovereignty that UN involvement is felt 
to create (White 2008). However, the UN is the 
body which, through the OST, has provided 
guardianship over celestial bodies, acting as 
custodian for mankind as a whole. It would thus 
seem credible to assume the UN will play a role in 
their future governance.  
 
Without the support of key actors and spacefaring 
powers, a universal agreement will not be reached. 
The impacts of hegemonic influence and fragile 
perceptions of sovereignty are key conditioning 
factors in any role the UN may play in facilitating 
future negotiations and the likelihood of a 
practical deal being achieved.  
 
An interesting legal precedent establishing 
sovereignty in space exists outside of the UN 
through the legal arrangement created for the 
International Space Station, but this represents a 
narrow agreement that is of limited relevance as a 
template for establishing property rights on 
celestial bodies. It does highlight that international 
agreement for space can be cultivated outside of 
the UN. 
 
The International Telecommunications Union 
(ITU) and the International Seabed Authority 
(ISA) are each organizations that offer useful 
parallels and potential models for any future 
organization administrating the property rights of 
celestial bodies, but each has notable flaws.  
 
The ISA created a new distinct legal framework 
because it was based on the principle of the 
Common Heritage of Mankind (CHM). This 
manifests operationally through the ISA being 
authorized to conduct its own mining operations, 
but private and state companies have to give a site 
of equal value or size to any of their operations in 
order to qualify for a license (Nagender Nath & 
Sharma 2000). The ISA is also required to 
distribute its revenues to states with a particular 
focus on developing countries; this aspect of 
social justice was not welcomed by the United 
States, concerned that this was a form of 
international socialism. CHM was included in the 
ill-fated Moon agreement, and Leib (2015) argues 
that it was central to its failure. This will 
undoubtedly lead to tension in future agreements 
governing celestial bodies and could be a sticking 
point in negotiations. Ultimately, the CHM 
principle and the lack of market interest in seabed 
mining restrict the usefulness of the ISA as a 
template for any future body governing celestial 
body property rights.   
 
The ITU administers the largest activity in the 
space sector, allocating orbital slots and radio 
frequencies for satellites, each of which is a 
limited commodity. It involves a voluntary 
arrangement between states which could be 
attractive to policy makers keen to maintain 
flexibility. However, the lack of an enforcement 
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mechanism does not make treaty obligations any 
less binding from a legal perspective. The ITU’s 
longevity is evidence of the successful role that 
states believe it plays, but as a template it has a 
weakness, which is its lack of an enforcement 
mechanism. Any future body governing or 
regulating the property rights of celestial bodies 
would have to include enforcement mechanisms 
to allow for the implementation of what it is 
meant to achieve, otherwise the characterizations 
of infirmity leveled at the ITU (Jakhu 2007; 
Cowhey 1999) will be just as valid.    
 
The creation of overarching international 
legislation to establish property rights on celestial 
bodies arises because while these are national 
issues, they ultimately require international 
agreements. Domestic laws such as the US Space 
Act of 2015 do not create overarching standards 
for all states to abide by, nor do they create a 
business friendly trade environment.  
 
International agreements do carry the baggage of 
domestic concerns and are influenced by 
dominant ideologies.  The dominance of 
neoliberal ideas within global institutions is likely 
to affect the outcome of any future agreement 
regarding off-world property rights. Privatization 
of two of the largest satellite organizations 
(Inmarsat and Intelsat) also shows, from the 
application of neoliberal ideas, the preference 
favoring private interests in global affairs. This 
likely presages what can be expected in a regime 
governing the property rights of celestial bodies, 
where the interests of the private sector may well 
take precedence.   
 
The current status quo under which space belongs 
to everybody and nobody has become 
unsustainable. The present legal regime offers 
little support to public and private actors seeking 
to grow the space industry. A new regime or set of 
governing principles is desirable to allow the 
potentially vast resources of the cosmos to be 
utilized, creating a new space economy which is 
of direct benefit to mankind. While the ITU and 
ISA may not provide perfect templates, they do 
offer beneficial and insightful information on 
what future legislation may and may not include. 
Ultimately, the realization of any private sector 
ambition to mine celestial bodies, a prospect 
which promises high risk for substantial rewards, 
is wholly dependent on the development of a 
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Managing Criminalized Power Structures: The Predominant Spoilers 
of Peace Processes 
 
Michael Dziedzic 
Criminalized Power Structures (CPS) exploit illicit wealth acquisition to usurp political power and 
constitute a leading source of obstruction when the international community intervenes in states 
struggling to emerge from civil conflict. Structures operating outside domestic or international law may 
constitute a crucial barrier or spoiler for UN and coalition peace operations. This held true in the post-
Cold War interregnum before 9/11 and is likely to continue for stabilization operations, regardless of 
outcomes from enormous international security investments in Afghanistan and Iraq. By understanding 
the different types of spoilers acting across cases, the United States and partners in the international 
community can align their responses so as to manage threats from CPS. 
   
 
 
Twenty years ago Stephen Stedman 
published “Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes,” 
identifying spoilers as the “greatest source of risk”
 
to successful implementation of peace agreements.
1
 
This sparked a prolific response in the literature. 
Most of this scholarship, however, failed to address 
the intent of Stedman’s article, which was to 
develop “a typological theory of spoiler 
management.”
2
  His actual aim was to assist policy 
makers in “correctly diagnosing the type of spoiler” 
and then devising appropriate “strategies that will 




The number of cases Stedman was able to draw 
upon in 1997 was limited to Angola, Cambodia, 
Mozambique, and Rwanda. This restricted the range 
of strategies available for evaluation. As Stedman 
noted: “not all combinations of strategy and spoiler 
type are covered in the cases, given the relatively 
few cases of spoiler management in the 1990s. For 
instance, neither coercive diplomacy nor use of 
force to defeat the spoiler is included.”
4
 
Accordingly, he regarded his conclusions as 
provisional and hoped to inspire further research; 
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member of the Department of Political Science, U.S. 
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Vol. 22, No. 2 (Fall 1997): 5-53. 
2




 Ibid. 20. 
however, as Nilsson and Söderberg Kovacs 
conclude in their 2011 review of the spoiler 
literature, “much more research is needed in terms 
of identifying various strategies for managing 
already manifest spoilers under different 
circumstances, a topic that has advanced 





The purpose here is to summarize findings and 
recommendations from recently published research 
addressing ten cases of peace implementation from 
1999-2016. These were featured in Criminalized 
Power Structures: The Overlooked Enemies of 
Peace, a work devoted to advancing Stedman’s 





Findings from three cases are summarized below: 
Bosnia’s Third Entity Movement (irreconcilable 
spoiler), Kosovo’s Kosovo Liberation Army 
(violent opponent with negotiable interests), and 
Afghanistan’s Criminal Patronage Networks 
(supporter of the peace process). Salient lessons 
from the other cases from each type are included in 
the discussion of the takeaways for that class of 
spoiler. Our central finding is that strategies used in 
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the most successful cases aligned with three 
mutually reinforcing lines of effort involved in 
conflict transformation (as defined in Quest for 
Viable Peace).
7
 The primary audience for our 
findings and recommendations is the policy 
community since we seek to enhance international 
capacity for spoiler management; however, 
energizing the scholarly community to respond to 
Stedman’s exhortation for research to advance a 
typological theory of spoiler management is a 
closely related intent. 
 
This article provides empirical evidence that 
criminalized power structures (CPS) constitute 
perhaps the predominant spoiler threat to peace and 
stability operations. This thesis builds on the 
literature on war economies. The Economic 
Agendas in Civil Wars (EACW) project conducted 
by the International Peace Academy from 2000-
2003 “addressed the critical issue of how the 
economic agendas of armed factions sustain violent 
conflict and inhibit durable peace” (Italics added).
8
 
A 2003 EACW report characterized the 
phenomenon in the following terms:                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                    
 
Policy analysis has produced important 
insights on the impact that the predatory 
and illicit exploitation of natural resources 
and the pervasive criminalization of 
economic life can have on conflict 
dynamics…Both rebel or government 
combatants who benefited from predation 
during war may act as ‘spoilers’, using 




This conceptualization of war economies 
encompasses several characteristics that 
are central to the way criminalized power 
structures are defined here: 
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 Structures built on criminalized 
political economies do not 
magically dissolve with the 
advent of a peace agreement. 
 The economic factors conducive 
to violent conflict and its 
persistence after a peace 
agreement include 
“criminalization of economic 
life.” This term embraces the full 
spectrum of illicit gray and black 
market transactions described 
below. 
 Both the state and an armed 
opposition to it may exploit war 
economies. 
 
The imperative for addressing war economies is 
encapsulated by Mats Berdal and Dominik Zaum 
in Political Economy of Statebuilding: “war 
economies persist into peacetime, and are likely to 
shape the character of the post-war political 
economy. Transforming these very political war-





CRIMINALIZED POWER STRUCTURES 
 
The nexus between illicit wealth and 
political power is the central defining 
characteristic of a criminalized power structure. 
When ill-gotten wealth plays a decisive role in the 
competition for and maintenance of political 
power, the result is an illicit political economy 
orchestrated by a CPS. Power is typically 
maintained by violent repression of opposition 
groups and by dispensing patronage to a 
privileged clientele group which can lead to 
criminalization of both the public and private 
sectors. This tends to produce a zero-sum political 
economy conducive to conflict, but it may be 
masked by other cleavages in society (e.g., 
Rwanda, Bosnia, and Kosovo).
11
 Criminally 
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derived wealth may be a motivation for acquiring 
power (i.e., greed), or it may be a means used by 
rebel groups for rectifying group grievances. CPS 
may either capture the state or constitute an armed 
opposition to it.  
 
Power structures are criminalized when they are 
sustained by economic transactions that violate 
either domestic or international law. A 
criminalized political economy may operate in 
two dimensions: the gray and/or the black 
economy. The gray economy involves 
commodities that would normally be considered 
legal; however, the transactions are conducted in 
illegal ways. This includes evasion of customs 
duties (i.e., smuggling), avoidance or selective 
enforcement of regulations, manipulation of 
exchange rates, violation of economic embargoes, 
and looting of raw material resources. Cash and 
material resources of the government may also be 
siphoned off through misappropriation, 
procurement kickbacks, stripping of assets from 
state-owned enterprises, diversion of foreign 
assistance, and privatization of state assets to 
cronies at below market prices.  
 
The black economy involves patently illegal 
commodities typically associated with organized 
crime. Common activities include trafficking in 
illicit drugs, people, and weapons (in 
contravention to an arms embargo), kidnapping, 
extortion, and money laundering. 
 
One likely contributing factor to the 50% rate of 
return to conflict within five years after 
international intervention, as claimed by Kofi 
Annan, is that by overlooking this spoiler threat 
and arriving unprepared to deal with it, missions 
have squandered the “golden hour.”
 12
 In the cases 
examined in this project, the average delay in 
obtaining authorization for essential authorities 
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and capabilities to mount effective strategies has 
averaged almost five years. The consequences 
include allowing CPS to become entrenched, 
driving down prospects for success (i.e., 
sustainable peace), and prolonging missions 
indefinitely.  
 
Since 1990, the UN has intervened in 24 countries 
struggling to emerge from internal conflict.
13
 One 
of these, El Salvador, was not seriously bedeviled 
by a spoiler menace.
14
 At least 17 of the 
remaining 23 cases, or 75%, involved 
criminalized power structures, including three 
discrete cases cited by Stedman (i.e., Rwanda, 
Angola, and Cambodia): 
 The ruling Hutu elite in Rwanda, the akazu, 
viewed the Arusha Accords as a threat to 
their predatory regime causing them to 




 Jonas Savimbi, leader of União Nacional 
para a Independência Total de Angola in 
Angola (UNITA), was able to reject his loss 
in the 1992 Angolan elections because, 
according to Stedman, he “continued to have 
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uninterrupted sources of revenue through 
UNITA's control of diamond mines…”
16
 
 The Khmer Rouge (KR) in Cambodia, 
Stedman notes, sustained their resistance to 
the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia 
(UNTAC) through “the inflow of arms and 
petroleum and the outflow of gems and logs, 
a major source of DK's [KR's] income.”
17
 
 Hun Sen, leader of the State of Cambodia, 
refused to accept his loss in the 1993 
elections and blackmailed UNTAC into a 
power sharing arrangement. The result, 
according to Global Witness, has been that 
both Hun Sen and the Khmer Rouge 
continued to finance their military activities 
through illegal logging, and today “the 
country’s most powerful logging syndicate 
is led by relatives of Prime Minister Hun 




Our own research identifies eight discrete cases 
(i.e., Afghanistan, Bosnia, Democratic Republic 
of the Congo, Guatemala, Haiti, Iraq, Kosovo, and 
Sierra Leone). The findings of another volume 
confirm most of our cases and add Liberia to the 
list.
19
 Evidence assembled by the Enough Project 
in its study on violent kleptocracies in Africa adds 
Sudan, South Sudan, Somalia, Burundi, and the 
Central African Republic.
20
 This is the basis for 
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these deadly conflicts is the control of a hijacked state 
and the natural resource wealth of the country. This 
claiming that criminalized power structures are 





There are several conceptual and 
typological differences in the approach taken here 
as compared with Stedman’s path-breaking work 
that need to be made explicit. First, he originally 
equated spoiling behavior with the use of violence. 
As Nilsson and Söderberg Kovacs note, “More 
research, however, ought to be devoted to the non-
violent aspects of spoiling behavior…a 
phenomena we know only little about in spite of 
its widespread occurrence.”
21
 This certainly 
applies to criminalized power structures, and this 
project has examined both violent and non-violent 
forms of obstruction to peace implementation. 
 
Second, the above revision of the spoiler 
definition has implications for the typology that 
should be used to guide the strategic response. 
Clearly, strategies must be tailored to whether 
violent or non-violent means are employed. 
Stedman’s spoiler typology was based on the 
nature of spoiler’s intentions (i.e., total, greedy, or 
limited).
22
 A more useful approach is to 
distinguish among types of CPS according to their 
relationship to the peace process.  
 
One of these distinctions must be whether they 
use violent or non-violent means to oppose the 
peace process. Additionally, Steadman’s 
categories of intentions can be collapsed into 
whether their interests are negotiable (i.e. greedy) 
or irreconcilable (i.e., total). Stedman’s limited 
spoilers, as he defines them, could fall into either 
of the above categories. Finally, CPS can be 
classified according to whether they support or 
oppose the peace process.  
 
Perhaps the central conceptual innovation of this 
work is to propose that a CPS can have a profound 
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spoiling effect even if it does not overtly oppose 
the peace process. The kleptocratic nature of a 
CPS can produce a crippling loss of legitimacy or 
a hollowing out of the state’s capacity to perform 
essential functions (e.g., security). The 
administrations of Hamid Karzai in Afghanistan 
and Nouri al Maliki in Iraq provide salient 
examples of this. Accordingly, the examination of 
the empirical record of the international 
community’s efforts to deal with CPS in 
Criminalized Power Structures: The Overlooked 
Enemies of Peace is organized around these three 
discrete types: 
 
 Irreconcilable Adversaries (oppose peace 
process, use violence, irreconcilable 
interests) 
 Violent Opponents with Negotiable 
Interests (oppose peace process, use 
violence, negotiable interests) 
 Supporters of the Peace Process (support 
peace process, do not use violence, 
negotiable interests) 
 
The spoiler’s relationship to the peace process 
also provides a handy yardstick for determining 
whether the strategies adopted have been 
successful or not by measuring their ability or 
propensity to spoil the peace process. Success is 
defined as eliminating the risk that CPS posed to 
peace and stability. To determine whether the strategy 
adopted by the mission made progress in “subduing” a 
given CPS, we compare the type at the inception of 
the intervention with the type it was when the case 
study was completed.  
 
Progress has been made with irreconcilables if 
they have been neutralized or if they have been 
compelled to negotiate. For a violent CPS with 
negotiable interests, cessation of the use of 
violence or opposition to the peace process 
indicates success. For supporters of the peace 
process, a reduction of illicit activities to the point 
that they no longer constitute a threat to domestic 
stability or allow the CPS to perpetuate itself in 
power through illegitimate means constitutes 
success. If no CPS existed prior to the intervention, 
their emergence as a threat to the peace process 
without an effective strategic response is a hallmark of 
failure.  
 
The purpose here is not to measure the success of the 
overall intervention but rather to assess whether 
spoiling activity was effectively reduced or ended so it 
no longer threatened the peace implementation 
process. The focus of analysis was to identify the 
common denominators of success of strategies 
used to confront each type of CPS. The 
methodology used was structured, focused 
comparison. This is the same methodology adopted by 
Stedman. 
 
We examined the following ten cases:  
 
Irreconcilable Adversaries 
Bosnia: Third Entity Movement; Guatemala: 
Illegal Entities and Clandestine Security 
Apparatus; Sierra Leone: Revolutionary 
United Front; Haiti: Gangs of Cité Soleil  
 
Violent Opponents with Negotiable Interests 
Kosovo: Kosovo Liberation Army; 
Democratic Republic of the Congo: M-23; 
Iraq: Jaish Al-Mahdi 
 
Supporters of the Peace Process 
Colombia: Paramilitaries; Afghanistan: 
Criminal Patronage Networks; Iraq: Nouri al-
Maliki  
 
Considerations involved in selecting these cases 
were the types of CPS involved (a minimum of 
three cases was required for each type so that 
generalizations could be drawn); a range of 
successes, partial successes, and failures; a mix of 
both states and insurgencies as CPS; and 
geographic diversity. Findings from the Bosnia, 
Kosovo, and Afghanistan cases are summarized, 
below, along with a recapitulation of the general 
findings from all other cases for each of these 
types. 
 
IRRECONCILABLE ADVERSARIES:  
BOSNIA’S THIRD ENTITY MOVEMENT 
 
The Bosnia case is distinguished by the 
unequivocal success of the strategy that was 
eventually implemented to prevent the Third 
Entity Movement from scuttling the Dayton peace 
process. On the other hand, it is typical of other 
cases involving irreconcilables in that the grave 
threat they posed was neglected for years. Case 
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study authors Oscar Vera and Karmen Fields 
make clear that a simplistic diagnosis of the cause 
of the conflict obscured a profound and fateful 
reality: 
 
The conventional interpretation of the 
conflict as exclusively ethnic obscured the 
role of the country’s criminalized power 
structures in provoking the war and then 
perversely collaborating with their 
counterparts across ethnic lines to profit 
from it. Owing to this blind spot…, the 
ensuing peace settlement failed to come to 
grips with the destabilizing impact of 




Owing to this ignorance about the threat from 
Bosnia’s three “parallel power structures,” there 
were no provisions in the Dayton Peace Accords 
to deal with their covert and sometimes violent 
obstructionism. International police were unarmed 
and empowered merely to mentor, monitor, and 
train. The other components of the legal system 
were ignored. This meant that Bosnia’s CPS were 
effectively left to judge themselves. Although the 
NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) enjoyed 
a robust mandate, it was focused exclusively on a 
narrowly defined threat from the formal military 
forces of the protagonists. When violent resistance 
mounted, often in the form of “rent-a-mobs,” 
IFOR branded appeals for their involvement as 
“mission creep.” It took several years before it 
would recognize that Bosnia’s criminalized 
parallel power structures were the center of 
gravity for stabilizing the conflict.  
 
The Third Entity Movement contravened one of 
the red lines of the Dayton Agreement since it 
aspired to dissolve the Bosniak-Croat Federation 
and create an entity co-equal with the Serbs and 
Bosniaks. This would have been a potentially 
irreversible step toward unification with Croatia, 
which would have rendered the survival of the 
Bosniak rump state untenable. The result would 
almost certainly have been a return to conflict. 
The only suitable strategic goal was to prevent 
this non-negotiable project. 
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Croatian President Franjo Tudjman was the 
driving force behind the Third Entity Movement, 
and he continued to pursue this ambition 
assiduously until he died in 1999. The clandestine 
elements of this CPS included a nexus between 
the Croatian Intelligence Service and its 
counterpart in Herzeg-Bosna. There was also a 
stay-behind unit of the Croatian Army that was 
converted into the Monitor M Company to avoid 
complying with the Dayton requirement that all 
Bosnian Croat military units be placed under 
Federation command. Other informal elements 
were the Convict Battalion that had perpetrated 
notorious acts of ethnic cleansing during the 
conflict and the Renner Transportation Company 
that was a cover for arms trafficking and other 
transnational crime and the perpetrator of violent 
confrontations with Moslem returnees.  
 
One of the primary sources of illicit revenue for 
the Third Entity Movement stemmed from 
Tudjman’s diversion of proceeds from the sale of 
Croatian state assets into the Hercegovacka Bank 
in Mostar that had been established by the 
Monitor M Company. From 1998 to 2000, $180 
million a year was channeled into the bank. The 
head of Monitor M, “former” Croatian Army 
General Ante Jelavic, used these secret funds to 
capture the Bosnian Croat vote in the 1998 
Bosnian general elections and become the 
Bosnian Croat member of the state-level tri-
presidency. Smuggling was another massive 
source of revenue, and the Renner Transport 
Company was central to this.  
 
Among the debilitating flaws in the international 
strategy was a requirement to conduct elections in 
a year. This unseemly haste to turn ownership 
over to local authorities profoundly exacerbated 
the ability of Bosnia’s three CPS to obstruct 
reform efforts because they gained a façade of 
democratic legitimacy after the elections. Another 
flawed component of the strategy was “relying on 
institutions and leaders in the Federation and the 
RS to arrest war criminals and investigate and 
prosecute corruption, organized crime, and 
domestic terrorism.”
24
 It took two years of 
ineptitude before the Peace Implementation 
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Council (PIC), an international body created to 
oversee implementation of the Dayton Peace 
Accords, sought to correct the impotence of the 
civilian head of the mission, the High 
Representative. In 1997 the PIC granted the High 
Representative authority to cashier government 
officials who obstructed Dayton along with the 
power to bring reforms that local politicians 
refused to enact into effect via decree (i.e., the 
Bonn powers). Simultaneously, SFOR (IFOR’s 
successor) was having an epiphany about the root 
cause of the conflict actually residing in Bosnia’s 
political-criminal power structures, causing it to 
shed IFOR’s contemptuous attitude about 
anything that smacked of policing. The 
deployment to SFOR of a Multinational 
Specialized Unit of “gendarme-like” forces with 
expertise in use of non-lethal force for crowd and 
riot control took place in 1998.  
 
To lay the foundation for action against the Third 
Entity Movement required use of the Bonn 
powers to impose a witness protection law; amend 
the Federation Supreme Court Law to make it the 
court of first instance for cases involving 
terrorism, drug trafficking, inter-Cantonal crimes, 
and organized crime; and create the Federation 
Prosecutor’s Office to try these cases. Personnel 
working in these institutions were vetted by the 
international community to assure an honest 
judicial system. A special unit of the Federation 
police was vetted and trained to apprehend 
suspects.  
 
Once the means had been put in place, the military 
and civilian components of the international 
community carefully coordinated intelligence-led 
operations among themselves and trusted 
members of the Bosnian community. The first 
operation targeted the Renner Transport Company. 
As the Federation Police were attempting to 
launch the operation, it was leaked and the 
suspects fled; however, this exposed linkages 
between organized crime, the Cantonal Police, 
and the Bosnian-Croat intelligence service 
(National Security Service [SNS]).  
 
This led SFOR to launch Operation WESTAR in 
October 1999 against the SNS. This was an 
unmitigated success resulting in confiscation of 
forty-two computers laden with information about 
illicit money-making schemes and espionage 
against virtually the entire international 
community. After assessing this trove of data, 
SFOR discovered that the Croatian Intelligence 
Service and SNS were working together and that 
Croatia was sending money to support the Third 
Entity Movement through the Monitor M 
Company.  
 
This led to the discovery of their Achilles heel: 
the Herzegovacka Bank and the flow of illicit 
revenues from Croatia. With support from SFOR 
and the Federation Ministry of Interior and 
Financial Police, the High Representative 
mounted an operation to take control of the bank 
seizing sufficient evidence to mount twenty 
criminal investigations including eventual charges 
against Jelavic. 
 
Vera and Fields sum up the results as follows: 
“(T)he Movement was dealt a fatal blow and 
violent resistance to Dayton from Herzeg-Bosna 
was ended.”
25
 Unfortunately for the prospects for 
stabilization in the rest of Bosnia, however, 
informal political-criminal structures continue to 
hold sway in the Bosniak and Serbian polities. 
Vera and Fields conclude with this trenchant 
analysis: “(I)f the international community had 
begun the intervention in Bosnia with a basic 
understanding of the illicit, parallel structures in 
power in each ethnic community, coupled with the 
authority that was eventually granted at Bonn-
Petersburg and the will to use it to hold the elites 
at the top of these structures accountable, the odds 





LESSONS FOR IRRECONCILABLE CPS 
 
 Failure to assess the CPS threat properly 
is likely to place the mission in grave 
jeopardy.  
 
The interventions in Bosnia, as well as in Haiti 
confronting the gangs of Cité Soleil and in Sierra 
Leone dealing with the Revolutionary United 
Front (RUF), all nearly collapsed owing to the 
failure to recognize the existential threat that CPS 
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 One salient lesson is that the 
attainment of a peace agreement does not equate 
to a “post-conflict” environment. Planning should 
accordingly be based on worst-case assumptions 
about threats to the peace process. Another lesson 
is that it is folly to dismiss the CPS threat as just a 
“criminal” problem and not a concern for the 
military contingent as occurred in Bosnia and 
Haiti. 
 
 An effective way to deal with 
irreconcilable CPS is use of superior force 
in a proactive and coordinated manner by 
both military and police contingents. 
 
Once it is clear that the mission is confronting an 
irreconcilable spoiler, the appropriate aim is to 
dismantle and defeat it, preferably through arrest 
and prosecution. Ironically, international 
interventions have achieved their highest degree 
of success in these cases—after initially courting 
disaster. CPS threats in Bosnia and Sierra Leone 
are the only cases we examined that were 
eliminated, and both involved proactive use of 
superior force by a robust military and police 
contingent. 
 
 Depriving CPS of access to illicit revenue 
is an effective way to defeat them. 
 
Essential to success in Bosnia was taking control 
of the Herzegovacka Bank that had been the 
source of illicit funds for the Third Entity 
Movement. In Sierra Leone the mission mounted 
operations to retake the diamond mines from the 
RUF, their operational center of gravity.
28
 
   
 Use of intelligence-led operations is an 
essential means. 
 
Intelligence was a critical enabler for the 
operations mounted in Bosnia, Sierra Leone, and 
Haiti. 
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 The mission must ensure that the entire 
legal continuum—from intelligence to 
incarceration—is able to function. 
 
In Haiti, the Joint Mission Analysis Center 
collected critical tactical intelligence, but to use 
this intelligence required a SWAT team to 
conduct high risk arrests. In Bosnia, this 
specialized policing capability was provided by 
IFOR’s Multinational Specialized Units. The most 
difficult gap in this continuum to fill, however, 
has been to prosecute and convict CPS members 
(See below). 
 
 Allowing CPS ownership over the legal 
system is not the way to end impunity. 
 
In Bosnia and Guatemala (which confronted a 
spoiler threat from a Clandestine Security 
Apparatus), CPS initially retained their influence 
over the legal system in spite of the extraordinary 
courage of individual judges, prosecutors, and 
police.
29
 Only after the international community 
was empowered to play a direct role in the legal 
system was the CPS spoiler threat tamed. 
 
 For peace to be sustainable, the capacity 
of local institutions to combat impunity 
through the rule of law, transparency, and 
accountability is essential. 
 
The success in Sierra Leone has been sustained by 
reform of the police, army, and intelligence 
service with emphasis on accountability and 
civilian control. In contrast, the UN Stabilization 
Mission in Haiti suffered a two-year delay in 
being provided a mandate to develop the rule of 
law. Coupled with this has been the failure to 
establish an effective accountability regime for the 
Haitian National Police to deal with the risk of 
politicization and criminalization of the country’s 
only security force.  
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VIOLENT OPPONENTS BUT NEGOTIABLE 
INTERESTS: 
KOSOVO LIBERATION ARMY  
 
Even though the conflict in Kosovo was 
self-evidently driven by a dispute between 
Albanian and Serb communities over who should 
exercise sovereignty, the Kosovo Force (KFOR) 
did not anticipate that its forces would face a 
greater security challenge from violence against 
the Serbs by extremist elements of the Kosovo 
Liberation Army (KLA) than from armed 
resistance by Serb forces. Also overlooked was 
the less apparent but no less vicious struggle 
within Kosovo’s Albanian community between 
the KLA and followers of pacifist Ibrahim 
Rugova to fill the power vacuum created by the 
withdrawal of Serb forces. The instrument used in 
this case was an assassination campaign against 
Rugova’s supporters by the KLA’s National 
Intelligence Service (SHIK) that subsequently 
transferred its allegiance to the Democratic Party 
of Kosovo (PDK), one of several political parties 
formed by former KLA leaders.  
 
In spite of its executive mandate, the UN Mission 
in Kosovo (UNMIK) decided initially to rely 
totally on the local judiciary, which effectively 
meant use of Albanian judges, owing to the 
inordinate risks Serb judges confronted. Within a 
year the ensuing injustice meted out to Serbs and 
the total impunity enjoyed by former KLA 
members compelled UNMIK to introduce 
international judges and prosecutors into 
Kosovo’s legal system. The mission’s other 
critical blind spot was the fixation on the formal 
economy to the neglect of the need for effective 
corporate governance structures to prevent the 
illicit capture of revenue from publicly owned 
enterprises, one third of Kosovo’s economy. 
 
The litany of risks engendered by the failure to 
recognize violent extremist elements within the 
KLA as a CPS includes attempted ethnic 
cleansing; use of clandestine intelligence 
apparatchiks to eliminate political competitors; a 
void in the rule of law; and the capture of a 
sizeable segment of the economy that was 
accounted for by publicly owned enterprises. The 
golden hour was lost, and it took several years to 
cobble together capabilities required to complete 
the “intelligence-to-incarceration” continuum 
needed to deal with violent obstructionism. 
 
In spite of UNMIK’s initial shortcomings, the 
mission did quickly establish that the KLA’s 
interests were negotiable. The signing of the 
“Undertaking” less than a month after the 
inception of the mission obligated the KLA to 
demilitarize and transform itself into an unarmed 
civil defense force. This was a crucial step in 
affording the KLA an alternative to the use of 
violence to pursue their unsatisfied war aims. 
 
Owing to his prior experience with CPS in Bosnia, 
UNMIK Principle Deputy Jock Covey established 
the mission’s way to deal with violent extremists: 
support those who support the peace process and 
oppose those who oppose it. For KLA extremists 
and their Serb counterparts, the so-called 
Bridgewatchers, “peace” was but the perpetuation 
of conflict through other violent means. These 
sources of continuing instability had to be 
confronted, and the cost of violent obstructionism 
had to be rendered prohibitive.  
 
Simultaneously across all of UNMIK’s lines of 
effort (political, security, rule of law, and 
economic), this “stick” was matched with a 
parallel effort to establish more attractive peaceful 
and licit alternatives for the competition over 
power and wealth. Eventually this overarching 
strategy was branded “conflict transformation.”  
 
As defined in Quest for Viable Peace, conflict 
transformation “entails diminishing the means and 
motivations for violent conflict while developing 
more attractive, peaceful alternatives for the 
competitive pursuit of political and economic 
aspirations.”
30
 This strategy consists of three 
reinforcing components: 
 
 Shape the context by dismantling or 
disrupting spoiler networks so as to 
neutralize their ability to thwart the peace 
process.  
 
This is not a task indigenous institutions can be 
expected to discharge. The mission must come 
prepared to confront the CPS threat itself; 
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otherwise the golden hour will be squandered and 
the mission may be placed in jeopardy. This step 
is typically neglected, however, in favor of simply 
developing institutional capacity and transitioning 
to national ownership. In the presence of CPS 
with a high degree of overlap between criminal 
and political power, failing to shape the context 
first is a fatally flawed strategy.  
 
There are potentially replicable principles in the 
way UNMIK implemented this strategy. First, 
since it had to rely heavily on KFOR initially, 
these two entities needed to establish collaborative 
civil-police-military decision making and 
planning mechanisms. Second, at the heart of the 
strategy was the conduct of joint military and 
police intelligence-led operations to strike against 
militant extremists. Third, confronting the 
impunity of CPS requires the deployment of the 
full continuum of rule of law capabilities from 
intelligence to incarceration, and internationals 
need to arrive prepared to take the lead. Finally, 
the center of gravity of the economic strategy is to 
deprive violent obstructionists of their sources of 
illicit revenue.  
 
 Develop institutional capacity to resolve 
disputes peacefully and generate wealth 
through legal means.  
 
Peaceful alternatives include free and fair 
elections; respect for minority rights; monopoly of 
force by the state coupled with a mentality of 
service; rule of law with the capacity to hold the 
most powerful accountable; and an enabling 
environment for a market-based economy. 
 
 Nurture safeguards on the exercise of 
power to ensure that the institutional 
capacities being developed, especially the 
security apparatus and judicial system, do 
not again become instruments of 
persecution of the opposition, that public 
revenue generation and expenditure are 
not captured by political-criminal 
networks, and that illicit revenue does not 
determine who governs.  
 
Essential for this purpose are the capacities to 
observe governmental performance (transparency) 
and punish misconduct (accountability). Processes 
linked to the state, such as competitive elections 
that permit alternation in power, an autonomous 
judiciary, and independent oversight mechanisms 
for the security sector, are necessary but not 
sufficient. A vibrant civil society is also required, 
including a free press; non-governmental 
organizations dedicated to exposing corruption 
and shielding whistle blowers; and an independent 
intellectual community.  
 
The conflict transformation strategy implemented 
by UNMIK and KFOR has largely been a success 
but with a caveat. KLA extremists indeed ceased 
the use of violence against the Serb community, 
their domestic political opponents, and 
neighboring states with contiguous Albanian 
populations.
31
 The April 19, 2013 normalization 
agreement with Serbia effectively guarantees that 
remaining issues in the relationship will be 
resolved through peaceful processes. The 
international political and security strategies, 
therefore, can be acclaimed as resounding 
successes.  
 
The caveat, however, is that the strategies to curb 
the impunity of former KLA leaders and prevent 
capture of the state by those bent on exploiting it 
for political and personal gain are seriously 
lacking. As a 2011 Clingendael report sums up, 
“The current dynamics of governance in Kosovo 
point to a concentration of power in the hands of 
the ruling PDK and its supporters, who are 





LESSONS FOR VIOLENT CPS WITH 
NEGOTIABLE INTERESTS 
 
 Conflict transformation is an effective 
way to deal with violent opponents of 
the peace process who have 
negotiable interests. 
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Conflict transformation entails shaping the peace 
implementation context by dealing assertively 
with violent spoilers while providing more 
attractive peaceful alternatives for pursuit of 
wealth and power. KFOR provided essential 
military support to UNMIK, which eventually 
fielded the capabilities needed to complete the 
“intelligence-to-incarceration” continuum and 
confront the KLA’s violent obstructionism 
through the legal system.  
 
Both the Kosovo and Iraq cases (the latter 
involving Jaish al-Mahdi) achieved a high degree 
of success by imposing dissuasive costs for the 
use of violence in tandem with providing the 
opportunity to compete for power peacefully in 
the electoral process.
33
 The final component of a 
conflict transformation strategy, establishing 
safeguards on the performance of core institutions 
(e.g., the security sector, legal system, revenue 
generation and expenditure, electoral process) was 
the weakest link in both Kosovo and Iraq. 
 
 Addressing the sources of illicit revenue 
should be a principal way of confronting a 
violent CPS with negotiable interests. 
 
All three cases examined in this project failed to 
make this a priority initially—to the detriment of 
the peace or stabilization process. In Kosovo, after 
failing to prevent the KLA from asserting control 
over publicly owned enterprises that constituted 
one-third of Kosovo’s economy, UNMIK 
belatedly mounted a concerted effort to establish 
accountable corporate governance structures. The 
lack of any mandate for the UN missions in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) to 
confront the looting of the eastern DRC’s 
resources explains the persistence of that conflict 
after nearly two decades.
34
 The lesson that should 
be etched indelibly into future planning is that a 
flourishing illicit political economy should be 
recognized as a primary threat to stabilization. 
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 Turning ownership of the legal system 
over to domestic judges is a 
counterproductive way to deal with CPS 
who are violent obstructionists. 
 
UNMK had to reverse its decision to place the 
legal system in the hands of Kosovar judges 
because it resulted in impunity for KLA 
extremists engaged in ethnic cleansing against 
Serbs and assassinating their Kosovo Albanian 
political rivals.  
 
 Capacity building should be accompanied 
by strategies to combat capture by CPS. 
 
One of the principles that should be borrowed 
from the development community is “Do no 
harm.” In an environment where CPS are present 
and vast sums of assistance are being expended, 
there is a real possibility that a substantial 
percentage will flow into the wrong hands. One 
essential remedy is to immediately emphasize 
standing up transparency and accountability 
mechanisms for the local institutions under 
development. This is especially vital for the 
security forces and intelligence apparatus since 
they are liable to be subjected to pressure for both 
politicization and criminalization.  
 




Case study authors Carl Forsberg and Tim 
Sullivan cite a description of the criminal 
patronage networks (CPN) permeating the Afghan 
government by Hamid Karzai’s National Security 
Advisor Rangin Dadfar Spanta in 2010 that 
“begin with the financial banking system, with 
corruption networks, with reconstruction and 
security firms and also with drugs and the 
Taliban; they are in Parliament and they are in 
government.”
35
 As the authors make clear, there 
was nothing traditional about Afghanistan’s 
criminal patronage networks.  
 
The origins can be traced to mujahedeen 
resistance to the Soviet intervention from 1979-89. 
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What began as a multi-ethnic opposition 
movement became polarized into competing 
ethnic camps in the wake of the Soviet withdrawal. 
The rivalry between the largely Pashtun Hezb-e 
Islami and the Tajik Jamiat-e Islami precipitated 
Afghanistan’s 1992-1996 civil war. The 
consequence was the emergence of the Taliban 
and their dominance of most of Afghanistan after 
1996, until the US responded to the 9/11 attacks 
that emanated from Afghan soil.  
 
The ensuing 2001 Bonn Conference, which serves 
in this case as the functional equivalent of a peace 
agreement, perversely became a prescription for 
criminalization of the state. In the estimation of 
the authors, “Corruption in Afghanistan reached 
crippling levels as a result of the character of the 
county’s post-2001 political settlement, which 
was built on the distribution of political power 
between factions formed during the country’s civil 
war.”
36
   
 
One of the outcomes of Bonn was to concede the 
defense and interior ministries to the Tajik party 
under Mohammad Fahim, which, the authors note, 
was a result of having occupied Kabul with his 
militias. Thus Karzai, who was designated as 
interim president by the Bonn Conference, was 
dealt a very weak hand. The only trump card that 
he might have played—U.S. support for 
constraining Fahim—was not forthcoming. Indeed, 
the Bush administration encouraged 
accommodation with Afghanistan’s regional 
potentates.  
 
As a result, there were no consequences for 
wholesale abuse of power and looting of state 
resources, which soon included siphoning off 
customs revenue, misappropriating international 
assistance, protecting heroin traffickers, and 
exploiting financial institutions for personal gain. 
Emblematic of the kleptocratic political economy 
that resulted was the collapse of Kabul Bank in 
2010, which required a bailout equating to more 
than 5% of the country’s GNP. According to 
Forsberg and Sullivan, “Under the influence of the 
Fahim family, Afghanistan's largest bank had, in 
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In a speech in 2002 Karzai effectively conferred 
impunity on CPN stating, “Justice becomes a 
luxury for now.”
38
 Even after winning election as 
President in 2004 and again in 2009, however, 
Karzai continued “a strategy of balancing, 
dividing, and co-opting—rather than 
confronting—Afghanistan’s fractious strongmen 
and their clients.”
39
 Rather than being a temporary 
expedient, impunity for members of Karzai’s CPN 
coalition was central to the illicit political 
economy upon which his regime was founded. 
 
The United States neglected the menace posed by 
Afghanistan’s CPN for years. Indeed, the authors 
note, “U.S. policy often exacerbated the problem 
by using regional strongmen and their CPNs as 
proxies in operations against al-Qaeda and 
Taliban fighters.”
40
 In 2003, when internecine 
violence among competing regional militia 
commanders posed a threat to stability, the United 
States adopted a “warlord strategy” involving 
coercive measures to compel disarmament of 
militias combined with co-optation of 
commanders into the central government.  
 
Rather than diminishing the CPN threat, however, 
this strategy merely traded off a non-
institutionalized renunciation of violence among 
themselves by these warlords for an expansion of 
the number of CPN divvying up governmental 
largesse. Demobilization of militia forces often 
resulted in rebranding their followers as police, 
endowing them with the legitimacy of the state to 
engage in predatory and criminal practices. In the 
assessment of Forsberg and Sullivan, “Violent 
conflict between armed militias and overt 
factionalism was sublimated into competition for 
state office, patronage, and wealth. Although 
intimidation remained omnipresent in both the 
public and private sectors, money replaced guns 
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as the leading source of political influence.”
41
 The 
consequence was to divert the focus of 
government away from responding to the needs of 
the population, thereby sapping it of legitimacy 
and public support against the Taliban insurgency. 
The authors call attention to “the connection 
between the Taliban’s reemergence after 2003 and 
the abuse of power by government officials, 




The strategy undertaken by the international 
community starting in 2002 focused primarily on 
capacity-building. This included massive 
resources allocated to the Afghan National 
Security Forces (ANSF), comprised of both the 
army and police. This strategy foundered, 
however, because “technical assistance and 
capacity-building alone, absent measures to 
counter the influence of CPN, could do little to 





To confront the crippling impact of CPN required 
depriving them of impunity, but this did not 
become a focus for U.S. policy until 2007. At first 
this “prosecutorial approach” relied upon the 
Afghan Attorney General’s office, with the result 
that the principal targets for prosecution were 
Karzai’s own political rivals and media critics. 
The U.S. coordinator for this initiative, Thomas 
Schweich, resigned in 2008, publishing an article 
that characterized Afghanistan as a narco-state in 





In 2009 a new entity for prosecution of political 
criminals, the Major Crimes Task Force (MCTF), 
was launched under the tutelage of the FBI with 
the intention of shielding it from political 
interference. After some initial successes, 
however, this initiative was neutralized by Karzai 
after the MCTF arrested Amad Zia Salehi, “a key 
palace insider who moved money to facilitate 
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In 2010, the NATO-led International Security 
Assistance Force (ISAF) designated CPN as a 
strategic threat and sought to counter them by 
creating a task force that stressed accountability as 
an essential component of Afghan security force 
development. ISAF fostered this through creation 
of oversight mechanisms to investigate and 
sanction criminal misconduct. Among the most 
effective countermeasures were international 
intelligence sharing and coordinated action by 
international law enforcement against key CPN 
members. International financial sanctions were 
another mechanism used. The authors conclude 
that such international action “became a critical 
way to degrade Afghanistan’s criminal networks, 
creating a deterrent effect that the Afghan judicial 




In evaluating the effectiveness of an international 
strategy, we begin by considering what type of 
CPS was present when the international 
community intervened. In Afghanistan, unless we 
count the Taliban, there was no legacy of CPS 
governance. The Afghan experience provides a 
surefire formula for failure: overlook the prospect 
that CPS are capable of emerging in the presence 
of a power vacuum, then wait for years to 
confront impunity until CPS have entrenched 
themselves in power because they are regarded as 
supporters.  
 
To succeed, the international community must 
come prepared to create dissuasive consequences 
for CPS exploiting their capacity for intimidation 
to capture state functions. This requires the means 
to promptly monitor and constrict illicit financial 
flows, impose costs such as international law 
enforcement actions, and establish mechanisms 
for transparency and accountability. 
 
Prospects for change exist in Afghanistan owing 
to the election of reformer Ashraf Ghani as 
president, but patronage networks are deeply 
embedded. Lacking in Afghanistan are durable 
institutions to mediate the contest for wealth and 
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power, governmental legitimacy, and popular 
support that are essential to prevail over the 
Taliban.  
 
Even though Karzai and various warlords either 
supported or were co-opted into supporting the 
Bonn Settlement, their criminal patronage 
networks became a ruinous barrier to stabilization 
against a Taliban insurgency that could more 
credibly claim to offer justice and an end to 
impunity. In sum, in spite of the recent emergence 
of hope for progress, the strategy implemented in 
Afghanistan until 2016 when this case was 
assessed can only be categorized as a failure 
because it ushered in the criminal patronage 
network phenomenon that delegitimized the 
government and severely encumbered the 
campaign against the Taliban. 
 
LESSONS FOR CPS THAT SUPPORT THE 
PEACE PROCESS 
 
 CPS that are supporters of the peace 
process have produced the worst 
outcomes. 
 
The criminal patronage networks that were 
spawned under the Karzai administration drained 
it of legitimacy thereby vitiating international 
efforts to defeat the Taliban. As had been the case 
in Bosnia and Haiti, for years in Afghanistan the 
military dismissed the CPS threat as a distraction 
from their mission. The strategy implemented to 
deal with the Nouri al-Maliki regime in Iraq also 
failed spectacularly. In addition to governing in a 
sectarian manner that alienated the Sunni 
population, Maliki’s pervasive network of 
patronage hollowed out the combat capability of 
the Iraqi Army to such an extent that it collapsed 





 The most effective antidote for a spoiler 
in disguise that supports the peace process 
is functioning institutions of transparency 
and accountability. 
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there against the hidden, symbiotic relationship 
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48
 These are not common attributes, 
however, of most political systems that are 
struggling to emerge from conflict.  
 
Failures in Afghanistan and Iraq can be attributed 
to the inability of international peace and 
stabilization missions to hold the Maliki and 
Karzai governments accountable for the 
debilitating consequences of corruption on 
corroding state capacity and legitimacy. This 
strongly indicates that the international 
community should place its emphasis on 
developing accountability mechanisms when 
confronted with a spoiler that is also a supporter 




The overall success rate for the ten cases 
treated in Criminalized Power Structures: The 
Overlooked Enemies of Peace is summarized 
below (Table I). This is not a statement about the 
success of the overall intervention but an 
assessment of whether spoiling activity by the 
party to the peace agreement examined in the case 
study was effectively reduced or ended.  
 
Surprisingly the highest rate of success has been 
achieved in dealing with irreconcilables; however, 
this has only resulted after the missions were either 
brought to the brink of calamity by failure to 
recognize the CPS menace (Bosnia, Haiti, and 
Sierra Leone) or the threat was allowed to 
metathesize into a nearly intractable challenge 
(Guatemala). Our second category, violent 
opponents with negotiable interests, produced a 
mixture of success and partial success, but this 
came only after lengthy and costly delays. The 
record in dealing with supporters of the peace 
process has been the least successful, with two 
failures: Iraq-Maliki and Afghanistan. The success 
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in Colombia, moreover, was attributable not to the 
international strategy but rather to the prevailing 
strength of the indigenous media and court system 
that exposed and effectively confronted the CPS 
network that had infiltrated the government. All of 
this reinforces the point that the international 
community has suffered from a persistent blind spot 
to the potential for CPS to pose a severe spoiler 
threat.  
 
This abbreviated review of the empirical record 
summarizes  the data we collected as we sought to 
advance Stedman’s quest for a typological theory of 
spoiler management.
49
 Below, the ends, ways, and 




Whenever spoilers are present, whether CPS or 
any other manifestation, the mission should 
include among its primary aims to minimize or 
eliminate the threat they pose to the peace or 
stabilization process. For CPS, however, the 
emphasis should be on curbing their spoiling 
behavior and not on seeking to stifle unrelated 




 Strategies should be tailored to the 
different types of CPS. 
 
Our case studies confirm Stedman’s assertion that 
there is “a range of strategies to deal with spoilers, 
from ones that rely heavily on conciliation to ones 
that depend greatly on the use of coercion...”
50
 
Strategies must be tailored, therefore, to the 
degree and type of recalcitrance manifested by the 
CPS.  
 
Irreconcilables are not amenable to conciliation 
and must be dismantled or defeated. Coercion is 
also an essential component of a strategy for 
combatting violent CPS with negotiable interests. 
The purpose for the use of force, however, is 
different. It is to raise the costs of using violence 
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to unacceptable levels. Since it is difficult to 
discern whether interests are reconcilable or not 
(especially in the wake of a peace agreement), it is 
prudent to combine any use of force in the face of 
episodes of violence with renewed overtures for a 
diplomatic resolution.  
 
Thus coercive diplomacy is appropriate for both 
types of CPS until irreconcilables make it 
manifest that negotiation is futile. To persuade 
CPS with negotiable interests that there are more 
attractive peaceful alternatives than exploitation 
of violence and criminally derived wealth to attain 
power also requires development of institutions 
that can sustain the rule of law; respect for human 
rights and minority rights; free and open elections; 
and an enabling environment for a free market 
economy.  
 
At the other end of the spectrum, for CPS that 
support the peace process, coercive force is 
inappropriate. Nevertheless, dissuasive 
consequences must be created for seeking to 
capture and exploit the state for personal or 
political gain. This requires development of 
institutions capable of providing transparency and 
accountability, including the rule of law and 
honest elections. 
  
 Conflict transformation is an appropriate 
way to combat all types of CPS. 
 
The strategies used in most successful cases 
(Bosnia, Sierra Leone, Kosovo, Iraq--JAM, and 
Colombia) aligned with the three mutually 
reinforcing lines of effort involved in conflict 
transformation.
51
 While all three lines of effort 
complement each other and should be used in 
tandem, the emphasis given to each should be 
tailored to the type of CPS engaged in spoiling 
behavior. The variation in emphasis that should be 
given to the three lines of effort involved in 
conflict transformation is specified below: 
 
- Shape the environment by addressing the 
drivers of conflict. 
 
This line of action will be most essential and 
decisive with irreconcilables (e.g., Bosnia, Sierra 
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Leone, and Haiti). Dissuasive consequences must 
be established for use of violence. To deal with 
irreconcilables as well as violent opponents, the 
mission must have the military proficiency to 
protect civilians, the mission, and the mandate; 
however, the most sustainable way to accomplish 
this is through intelligence-led operations, which 
result in evidence that can be used in legal 
proceedings that are autonomous from the 
influence of CPS.  
 
Exploitation of illicit revenue to capture power is 
also a driver of conflict. Since all CPS are 
characterized by this, all missions confronted by a 
CPS spoiler threat should have the ability to track 
illicit revenue streams, both internal and 
international, and shut them down.  
 
- Institutionalize more attractive peaceful 
alternatives for pursuit of wealth and 
power. 
 
This component of the strategy is at the heart of 
transforming violent opponents into peaceful 
supporters of the peace process. Legitimate 
institutions to mediate the competition for wealth 
and power need to be nurtured by the international 
community in order to sustain the peace process 
after the CPS threat has been diminished.  
 
The most challenging aspect is ending impunity 
when CPS have insinuated themselves into the 
apparatus of government. To do this, a more 
sophisticated approach than merely building 
domestic capacity and then turning ownership 
over is required. To stabilize these situations, it is 
vital for the international community to play a 
more direct role in buttressing the prevailing legal 
system in order to render CPS vulnerable to 
criminal prosecution and incarceration before 
transitioning to indigenous ownership (e.g., 
Kosovo).   
 
- Develop safeguards on the performance 
of institutional capacity that is being 
developed to prevent state capture and 
future abuse of power. 
 
This is the most effective way to prevent 
supporters of the peace process from emerging as 
dangerous spoilers. Safeguards provide 
transparency and accountability and serve as a 
barrier against capture of the state by criminalized 
elites. They must be developed in the structures of 
government and civil society to provide an 
effective check on abuse of power. 
 
The State Department’s Bureau of Conflict and 
Stabilization Operations has adopted conflict 
transformation as their paradigm for strategic 
planning, so this research provides empirical 
evidence that their strategy has the versatility to 






 Assess whether CPS are a threat and, if 




As Stedman observed, “(T)he choice of an 
appropriate strategy requires the correct diagnosis 
of the type of spoiler.”
54
 Just as vital is to avoid 
overlooking the CPS threat in the first place and 
exposing the mission to risk of failure and years 
of incompetence.  
 
 Track the revenue streams sustaining CPS 




All types of CPS rely on illicit revenue to secure 
and maintain power. To undercut this threat, 
expertise is needed to monitor illicit money flows; 
investigate grand corruption and theft of 
international assistance; prosecute those 
responsible; and seize ill-gotten gains. 
 
 When the domestic legal system has been 
suborned by CPS, the international 
community will need to play an active 




The international community must take the 
initiative to confront these enemies of peace. 
Essential capabilities include collection of 
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criminal intelligence; high-risk arrest; and 
international judges and prosecutors to adjudicate 
crimes against the mandate through the use of 
hybrid justice institutions. 
 





For peace to be sustainable and to avoid 
politicization or criminalization of the capacities 
developed by the international community, 
especially the security sector and intelligence 
apparatus, equal priority should be given to 
development of transparency and accountability. 
The most essential institutions are a free press; an 
independent judiciary; a mobilized civil society; 
and an electoral process conducive to alternation 
in power. 
 
One purpose of this article has been to present 
evidence that CPS are the predominant spoiler 
threat to peace implementation. The ten case 
studies detailed in Criminalized Power 
Structures: The Overlooked Enemies of Peace, 
three of which are summarized above, provide 
extensive documentation to substantiate this. 
Overlooking this spoiler threat has brought 
several of the missions examined by this project 
to the brink of collapse, and by arriving 
unprepared to deal with this recurrent threat, 
peace and stabilization missions have 
squandered the golden hour. In the ten cases we 
examined, the average delay in obtaining 
authorization for essential authorities and 
capabilities was almost five years.  
 
Another key finding of this work is that 
criminalized power structures come in three discrete 
forms: irreconcilables, violent opponents with 
negotiable interests, and supporters of the peace 
process. Owing to the variation in types of CPS, 
strategies must be designed to confront their 
spoiling behavior in an appropriate manner. The 
strategies used in the most successful cases (Bosnia, 
Sierra Leone, Kosovo, Iraq – JAM, and Colombia) 
aligned with the three mutually reinforcing lines of 
effort involved in conflict transformation.  
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Perhaps the most troubling consequence of the 
propensity to overlook criminalized power 
structures is that they may not only spoil peace 
processes and stability operations; they may also 
spoil international willingness to support the very 
enterprise of peace implementation. The ultimate 
goal of this work is to improve upon the success 
rate of interventions by asking the right questions 
before intervening so the risks posed by 
criminalized power structures are recognized prior 
to deployment. This will allow international peace 
missions to be endowed with authorities and 
resources required to succeed and to be guided by 
strategies appropriate for the type of CPS 
involved. 
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Case   CPS     Outcome     
Bosnia                            Third Entity Movement   Success (after risking failure)  
Sierra Leone  RUF     Success (after risking failure) 
Haiti   Gangs of Cité Soleil   Partial success (after risking failure) 
Guatemala CIACS     Partial success (after risks were                  
                                                  exacerbated) 
 
Violent Opponents with Negotiable Interests 
 
Case   CPS     Outcome 
Kosovo               Kosovo Liberation Army  Success, with qualifications 
Iraq    Jaish al-Mahdi    Success, with qualifications 
DRC    M-23     Partial success 
 
Supporters of the Peace Process 
 
Case   CPS     Outcome 
Colombia  Paramilitaries    Success  
Afghanistan   Criminal Patronage Networks  Failure 


















Initial exploration of the relationship between new technologies and strategic stability finds that 




The United States Air Force’s high 
speed/hypersonic integration and demonstration 
line of budgeting nearly tripled for fiscal year 
2017. The $92.8 million displays intensifying 
interest in the realm of hypersonic research.
1
 
Without providing details, the level of classified 
work being done in developing this technology 
has been said to be “far more extensive.”
2
 The era 
of hypersonic weapons is underway. With the 
introduction of new military technology, the 
effects on the methods by which future wars are 
fought and the political arena which will frame 
these conflicts should be considered. The 
strategist Colin Gray offers, “All military 
behavior is tactical in execution, but must have 
operational and strategic effect, intended and 
otherwise.”
3
 The purpose of this paper is to 
suggest that the capabilities presented by 
hypersonic weapons are inherently destabilizing at 
the strategic level. 
 
During testimony to the United States Congress in 
December 2015, leading policy expert James M. 
Acton of the Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace opened by stating, “Let me 
emphasize from the start that I am genuinely 
undecided about whether the United States should 
acquire CPGS (Conventional Prompt Global 
Strike) weapons. The capability would 
unquestionably convey potential benefits, but it 
would also carry potential risks. Today, in my 
opinion, the relative magnitudes of those benefits 
and risks are unclear.”
4
 It is important to note at 
the onset that this study aimed neither to find an 
answer to that question nor form any opinion on 
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the issue. The aim has been and remains to 
objectively weigh capabilities presented by this 
technology and assess the strategic implications. 
  
A level of difficulty exists in assessing weapons 
capability of a developing technology. Open 
source information leaves something to be desired 
in that it can be outdated or fails to reflect what a 
fielded weapons system may eventually look like. 
The desire to determine the effects of specific 
capabilities while remaining broad about what 
said capabilities look like on paper proved 
challenging.  
 
For this reason, it is important to outline the 
parameters of this discussion. The definition of 
strategic stability that will be referenced will be 
from scholar Elbridge Colby.
5
  He counts as stable 
any scenario providing “no incentives for nuclear 
use save for vindication of vital interests.” While 
there are a variety of systems being researched, 
hypersonic weapons will be broadly defined as 
any weapon travelling in excess of Mach 5—to 
exclude intercontinental ballistic missiles. Finally, 
the effects of these weapons systems on strategic 
stability will be viewed in a generic sense on the 
state level from no parochial perspective—
statements from different state perspectives will 
be utilized to frame the strategic environment and 




The 2010 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review 
uses the words “stable,” “stability,” and 
                                                          
5
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D.C. and is now U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for Strategy & Force Development (ed.).  
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“instability” forty-nine times in the main text, but 
governments around the world aspire to achieve 
“strategic stability”—an end which is as easily 
defined as it is attained.
6
 Certain forces, certain 
force employment postures, and certain kinds of 
negotiated agreements could be the means by 
which this goal is attained. The abovementioned 
definition that we will focus on, again, is “no 
incentives for nuclear use save for vindication of 
vital interests.”
7
 This definition reflects the 
intellectual marriage between strategic thought 
and nuclear weapons—the domain which 
hypersonic weapons will affect, intentionally or 
not. 
 
Gregory Koblentz’s Strategic Stability in the 
Second Nuclear Age outlines myriad reasons why 
the strategic environment is less certain now than 
it was during the Cold War. The same 
psychological imperatives that existed during the 
Cold War prevail in a less certain, more complex 
strategic environment involving new dynamics 
and technologies.  
 
Fifty-five years ago, Thomas Schelling and 
Morton Halperin defined strategic nuclear 
stability in a bilateral standoff between the Soviet 
Union and the United States as requiring 
reduction in incentives for preemptive strike. 
They added that strategic stability should be 
“reasonably secure against shocks, alarms and 
perturbations.”
8
 Since the fall of the USSR, it had 
seemed unlikely that great power conflict would 
erupt along the lines premised by 
Schelling/Halperin. “As the memories of the 
terrors of the world wars and the nuclear fears of 
the Cold War fade,” the legacy of the strategic 
nuclear environment persists, certainly in the US-





As Koblentz notes, today’s strategic environment 
is characterized by an “explosive mixture of 
unresolved territorial disputes, cross-border 
terrorism, and growing nuclear arsenals.”
10
 He 
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argues that compared to the Cold War bilateral 
dynamic, the world is complicated by, his term, 
“security trilemmas”—a traditional security 
dilemma in which there are unintentional tertiary 
effects.  
 
Contrary to what is true in the physical 
world, where three points provide more 
stability than two, in the international 
arena, triangles may make a situation 
more unstable and difficult to control 
(escalation dominance) as they introduce 





While the immediate threat of major power, 
nuclear war is not of immediate concern, the 
playing field is more crowded and less certain, 
and strategic theory has not kept pace. The 
strategic environment demands attention to 
various capabilities, which all provide “different 





The ability to deter, to coerce, or to assure all 
depend upon one’s ability to effectively 
communicate. The lack of balance presented by 
the states with strategic—nuclear and otherwise—
capabilities complicates the ability of any to 
effectively communicate. Over seventy years of 
cold war rivalry, a relationship gradually 
developed between the USSR and USA, but 
today’s environment provides no such 
relationships between strategic partners, save the 
enduring US-Russian legacy.  
 
At the same time, there remains a common and 
necessary thread of vagueness surrounding the 
policies of nuclear states. The US, Britain, and 
France all have limiting but nonbinding 
descriptions as to when they would resort to 
nuclear force if at all. Russia, for example, 
“reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in 
response to the use of nuclear and other weapons 
of mass destruction against Russia and/or its 
allies…[and in conventional war] when the very 
existence of the State is under threat.”
13
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In efforts to reduce the threat of nuclear use, the 
United States, and other powerful adversaries, are 
pursuing “non-nuclear precision-guided 
weapons…for striking critical, time-sensitive 
targets…[creating] new risks to strategic stability 
and [making] other states less willing to reduce 
their own reliance on nuclear weapons.”
14
 In 
regards to strategic weapons, it is the capability 
rather than the intent of a system that matters for 
national security policy makers.  
 
In the modern strategic environment, even a 
bilateral relationship in pursuit of strategic 
stability is complicated: 
 
The essential idea of strategic stability is 
that if both sides field forces that are 
capable of surviving a first strike and can 
credibly demonstrate to one another that 
their current and future capabilities cannot 
deny the other side a viable strategic 
deterrent, this confidence would eliminate 
the fear of preemption and the need to 
launch weapons early, either as irritants in 
a crisis or as dangers in conflict. This 
would reduce the danger that nuclear war 
might begin because of essentially 
technical “use or lose” or “itchy trigger-
finger” fears—concerns that can become 




Confusion, ambiguity, and pressure are the 
nemesis of strategic stability. Repercussions of 
these qualities are a function in part of 
fundamental aspects of deterrence thought that 
grew out of the Cold War. Certain modes of 
thought developed in those years still apply in the 
current environment. A brief discussion of these 
principles is thus essential in determining the 





Nuclear deterrence depends upon 
psychological elements of calculation for which 
there are no physical proofs, and it is therefore 
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precarious by nature.
16
 Deterrence calculations are 
made in the context of the strategic environment 
and the perceived threat from adversaries. At the 
root of formulating offensive and defensive 
security measures, as Admiral Richard Mies 
notes, “Nations don’t distrust each other because 





In 2016, policy support for tactical and 
operational employment of strategic systems 
seems to mirror Spurgeon Keeny’s mapping from 
the 1980s: those attempting to deter a wider range 
of actions and “those who are simply trying to 
carry out their military responsibilities in a more 
"rational" or cost-effective manner.”
18
 The 
patterns learned in the Cold War still provide 
lessons for the modern day. 
  
The first principle of importance to note is the fact 
that, “requirements of deterrence are not static. 
Rather, technology provides a dynamic variable 
which affects both the deterrer and the state to be 
deterred.”
19
 This reality is enduring. Policy 
makers still have to consider the strategic 
implications of new weaponry.  
 
This dynamic was foretold in writings from the 
Cold War. “This situation is not peculiar to 
present force structures or technologies; and, 
regardless of future technical developments, it 
will persist as long as substantial nuclear weapon 
stockpiles remain.”
20
 While this new wrinkle—
hypersonic weapons—is not necessarily a nuclear 
weapon issue, the existence of nuclear stockpiles 
by countries pursuing these technologies 
necessitates the consideration of these theories.  
 
Perhaps the most telling statement explaining this 
dynamic is as follows: 
 
Over time, aided by technological 
advancements in targeting accuracy, 
new delivery means, and improved 
command and control mechanisms, 
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competing notions of deterrence have 
evolved which are more traditional in 
their roots… deterrence by 
denial…emphasizes the traditional 
objective of military defense threatening 
to deny the attacker success in the 
achievement of military and political 
objectives, thereby deterring an attempt 
that would be not only costly but, more 




A stable dynamic, then, would be one in which 
neither side saw an incentive to strike first.  
The advent of an offensive weapon system that 
could disarm the adversary preemptively is 
incredibly destabilizing. “If either side feels that 
it could be deprived of a retaliatory capability, 





The duality of the offensive/defensive nature of 
nuclear weapons is made more complex in that 
any use would be “physically indistinguishable 
from weapons which are designed for a disarming 
first strike.”
23
  The new capabilities and resulting 
considerations coming from the development of 
hypersonic weapons requires a deeper 




The deterrent value of hypersonic 
weapons is summarized by former Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for International Security 
Policy Peter C.W. Flory in the following manner: 
  
In this new and uncertain environment, a 
“one size fits all” approach to deterrence 
is no longer appropriate; we must re-think 
our approach to 21st Century threats and 
tailor deterrence to assure our allies and 
friends, and achieve specific effects 
against a wide array of potential 
adversaries and circumstances, such as 
advanced military competitors, regional 
WMD states, and non-state terrorist 
networks. To do this we must have a 







broad range of credible strategic 
capabilities—including nuclear and non-
nuclear Global Strike capabilities, 





There is a value at the strategic level provided by 
hypersonic weapons. They could provide policy 
makers with an added dimension of options in a 
crisis or conflict. From a US perspective there 
exist “important political and strategic advantages 
… in being able to strike high-value targets 
having time-sensitive urgency that could not be 





As mentioned before, a great deal of strategic and 
deterrence thinking comes from the domain of 
nuclear weapons and policy. For example, a 2014 
RAND report on hypersonic technology suggested 
that hypersonics could be fitted to become a new 
type of unstoppable nuclear weapon.
 26
 Interesting, 
though, Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
Research and Engineering Stephen Welby said, 
“There’s nothing in the budget” related to 
modeling, researching, or exploring nuclear-




The United States Air Force does have a long-
term plan for the development of hypersonic 
technology. The timeframe suggests that a 
“tactical strike missile” would be the first 
operational military asset, ready around year 
2020. Future plans include an intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) platform 
around 2030, and the USAF aspires to produce a 
“reusable and persistent ISR and strike craft by 
2040.
 28  
 
These systems represent the emerging hypersonic 
cruise missile variety of weapon. However, two 
primary categories emerge within the literature: 
hypersonic cruise missiles and hypersonic 
maneuvering reentry vehicles. The latter category 
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—commonly referred to as boost glide reentry—is 
the primary focus of concern for this study. 
 
The development process for this technology will 
likely mirror that for all nations pursuing these 
capabilities. The technology’s effect on strategic 
stability will likely center on its strike role—i.e., a 
boost glide weapon launched via ballistic missile. 
Existing infrastructure for launching a boost-glide 
weapon would suggest this would also be the first 
capability to become operational. Potential effects 
on strategic stability are therefore most easily 
framed via boost glide reentry vehicles, although 
some effects may be true for the cruise missile 
variety as well. 
 
In assessing possible upsides for the weapon 
system, a January 2016 Mitchell Institute for 
Aerospace Studies report offered the following: 
  
Hypersonic weapons offer advantage in 
four broad areas for US combat forces. 
They can project striking power at range 
without falling victim to increasingly 
sophisticated defenses; they compress the 
shooter-to-target window, and open new 
engagement opportunities; they rise to the 
challenge of addressing numerous types 
of strikes; and they enhance future joint 
and combined operations. Within each of 
these themes are other advantages which, 
taken together, redefine military power 
projection in the face of an increasingly 




CAPABILITIES AND CONSEQUENCES 
  
Operational and tactical competencies 
provided and enhanced by hypersonic strike 
systems alone—future developments 
notwithstanding—are indeed impressive, exciting, 
and arguably necessary in a modern war scenario. 
Nevertheless, utilizing these weapons carries risks 
for those considering the strategic nuclear aspects 
of warfare.  
 
The speed at which hypersonic weapons travel 
could have negative strategic effects in terms of 
stability. The operational and tactical asset of 
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“[shrinking] the ‘time to target’ window” creates a 
problem in the strategic nuclear domain.  
 
“Fourth dimension” effects of “[getting] inside an 
adversary’s command, control, and battle 
management cycle” are also a tremendous asset at 




The speed of a hypersonic weapon greatly 
compresses the so-called “find, fix, track, 
target, engage, and assess” (F2T2EA) 
process, enabling US commanders the 
ability to penetrate an opponent’s decision 
making process, and as a result, rapidly 




However, regarding escalation control and 
incentives to strike first, the same capability 
becomes dangerous. By forcing an adversary’s 
decision making process, a rushed choice could 
lead to mistakes or misinterpretations. This is not 
desirable at the strategic level. An adversary 
fearing the destruction of its strategic weapons 
could feel the need to employ those weapons 





Hypersonic weapons provide unprecedented 
promptness and global reach. “A theater-ranging 
hypersonic missile will reach a target 1,000 miles 
distant within 17 minutes or less.
33
 The range of 
these weapons compounded with accuracy creates 
further pressure on decision makers in a crisis to 
feel as though their interests are held at immediate 
risk.  
 
Hypersonic weapons could effectively 
prosecute command, control, and 
communications (C3) points, key 
leadership, and key ground, naval, and 
maritime targets. Hypersonic strike 
weapons could more effectively engage 
high value targets…The speed and reach 
of hypersonic strike could preempt the 
launch of a theater ballistic missile. 
Hypersonic weaponry could also address 
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In the context of a nuclear crisis or the mindset of 
a strategic adversary, these aforementioned 
capabilities are themselves a forcing function for 
fearful, mistake-prone, and escalatory reactions. 
The mere perception of a capability regardless of 
intent is potentially destabilizing at the strategic 
level. 
  
The payload along with the kinetic ability of the 
weapon system is also concerning at the strategic 
level. A hypersonic weapon could be nuclear 
armed or provide combat effects like an anti-ship 
ballistic missile (ASBM).
35
 The capability to 
strike at hypersonic speed creates devastating 
effects: when dropped on one’s foot, a bowling 
ball inflicts a great deal of pain; the effect of a 
conventional payload, though, is amplified greatly 
once the “bowling ball” is shot from a cannon.  
 
Concerns about nuclear ambiguity have been at 
the forefront of hypersonic debate in the United 
States since “2006, when President George W. 
Bush’s administration first announced plans to 
replace the nuclear warheads on some Trident II 
D5 ballistic missiles with conventional 
weapons.”
36
 Inability to distinguish launch of a 
conventional versus nuclear missile resulted in 
Congress halting the program. Hypersonic 
weapons might also be indistinguishable between 
nuclear and non-nuclear variants—especially 
when launched from great distances. The strategic 
effects of conventional hypersonic weapons in any 
case complicate the analysis, which favors the 
argument that instability after deployment by any 
state party would increase.   
 
One solution to the warhead ambiguity issue was 
the suggestion that a state could observe the flight 
path of a weapon and determine that non-ballistic 
reentries were non-nuclear. This is complicated 
for a number of reasons, the first of which being 
that there may be no reason to assume non-
ballistic, boost-glide trajectories carry only 
conventional weapons. Further, given the current 
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technology, “[the state] would see the launch of a 
weapon that would quickly disappear from view, 
and the remainder of the flight path would be 
untraceable given current technology.”
37
 Another 
mitigating factor offered by the Air Force would 
be segregation. Ballistic missiles containing 
conventional, boost glide reentry vehicles would 
be positioned far and apart from the nuclear 
arsenal. “Two potential bases included 
Vandenberg Air Force Base on the West Coast 




Maneuverability of reentry vehicles is a double-
edged sword. Boost-glide reentry vehicles could 
allow a hypersonic weapon “to avoid flight over 
third party nations when approaching the target.”
39
 
This same quality would permit the weapon after 
launch to “radically change its trajectory to avoid 
missile defenses.”
40
 These tactical advantages are 
sometimes referred to as destination ambiguity, 
which, unfortunately, at the strategic level “could 
potentially lead a different adversary to conclude 
that they were under attack, risking inadvertent 
escalation. (The risk would be even greater if the 
observing state also misidentified [a conventional] 




Lockheed Martin’s Skunk Works® conception of 
a hypersonic weapon advertises “responsive strike 
capability on time-critical, heavily defended 
targets and…high survivability through altitude, 
speed and stealth.”
42
 Such capability at the tactical 
level would overwhelm or evade enemy air 
defense systems. Yet, these same systems of the 
adversary provide mutual strategic benefit in 
terms of psychological reassurance. A single 
target, removed by a hypersonic weapon in a 
successful tactical strike could have drastically 
different, destabilizing consequences at the 
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Viewed through the lens of a 
tactical/operational versus a strategic mindset, the 
same set of capabilities can be either encouraging 
or terrifying.  
 
Instead of working to establish air 
superiority, establish tanker support, 
position personnel recovery assets, 
establish airborne command and control 
networks, prosecute electronic warfare, 
and infiltrate attack platforms through 
myriad defenses, a hypersonic strike 
would unfold far more rapidly, with far 
fewer support requirements. Unable to 
intercept these high speed weapons, a first 
strike wave could simultaneously 
eliminate the most heavily defended 
enemy nuclear facilities and key targets in 
a fraction of the time, at a much lower 




The development of hypersonic weapons 
technology is likely to be perceived as an effort to 
deny other states their retaliatory nuclear 
capability—and achieve a splendid first strike, 
one of Schelling and Halperin’s conditions for 
strategic instability.
44
 In fact, nearly every 
provocative narrative warned of by Schelling and 
Halperin at the start of the Cold War is revisited in 
the modern security environment by today’s 
nonnuclear strategic weapons, which lie outside 
the nuclear “taboo” established gradually after 
1945. 
 
While the strategic arena is complex, with new 
players and new capabilities, it is important to 
recognize that strategic stability and deterrence 
principles have the same roots as during the Cold 
War and before that in the history of warfare. “To 
modify and adapt Clausewitz, nuclear weapons 
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Hypersonic weapons—conventional or nuclear, 
ours or theirs—further complicate the equation. 
Efforts to ease strategic miscalculation must also 
be stressed in coming years as the global security 
environment continues to shift.  
 
As Dr. Acton advocates, all parties pursuing 
hypersonic weapons should take steps to assess 
the full range of escalation risks.
46
 And as industry 
experts state, “Hypersonics technologies and 
weapons are both vitally important and 
inevitable.”
47
 This being the case, statesmen, 
military professionals, and industry leaders should 
consider the strategic implications of serving 
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The Physics of Wall Street: A Brief History of Predicting the 
Unpredictable by James Owen Weatherall 
 
Brian M. Kruchkow 
A USAFA graduate comments on predicting the unpredictable when surveying new spaces at the 
frontiers of defense policy. 
 
 
James Owen Weatherall’s book about the 
robust interplay of Wall Street and physics is a 
captivating romp about select physicists as well as 
a lesson on how finance both succeeds and falls 
short when it applies mathematical models to 
predict economic behavior.
1
 Such a book is a 
surprising candidate for a review in Space and 
Defense. Yet the ideas Weatherall presents are 
innovative, and they offer a framework for 
thinking about the problems with which this 
journal is concerned. In fact, The Physics of Wall 
Street provides a timely solution to a major 
challenge space and defense policy faces in 
modeling rare political events.  
 
The Physics of Wall Street is an easy read, for 
Weatherall has made his book interesting as both 
intellectual history and personal narrative.  
Finance and physics are not top reads for most 
people, of course, unless they are a practitioner in 
either field or they need highly specialized 
information. Yet Weatherall’s book appeals to a 
wide audience with insightful biographies of 
physicists who shaped finance. Each chapter of 
the book begins as a story about a notable 
physicist, and introduces the mathematical theory 
for which that person is known. Weatherall, as an 
example, uses anecdotes from the brief life of 
Louis Bachelier, intertwined with Bachelier’s 
revolutionary idea of how price changes are in 
essence a random walk.
2
 This is the central virtue 
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of Wall Street:A Brief History of Predicting the 
Unpredictable (New York: Mariner Books, 2013). 
2
 Weatherall 2013, pp. 1-24.  
of the book; neither physics nor finance ever 
becomes dull. Indeed, the mathematical theories 
of the physicists become irresistible as the 
currency for appreciating their rich life story.  
 
Weatherall adeptly explains complicated 
mathematics and financial theories, making these 
ideas accessible for anyone curious enough to 
open the book. One of the most delightful parts of 
The Physics of Wall Street is when Weatherall 
cheerfully walks the reader through the discovery 
of log-normal distributions (skewed bell curves) 
and how this realization affected expectations of 
volatility and ultimately prices in the stock 
market.
3
 Greater still is Weatherall’s explanation 
of Cauchy-distributions: how a mathematician 
named Benoit Mandelbrot proved that the 
standard deviation of prices most people thought 
of as normal actually needed to incorporate 
“extreme” events more frequently than expected, 
which Mandelbrot termed as “fattening the tails.”
4
 
The book eases the reader through these concepts 
and makes sure to enliven math and financial 
terms with stories about how Mandelbrot and 
others came to their ideas. In this way Weatherall 
transforms two difficult subjects into a pleasant 
and edifying journey for any reader.   
 
One area where the book falls short is 
Weatherall’s sanguine treatment of the people 
about which he writes. Weatherall, of course, 
must discuss the merits which make each of his 
characters worthy of being in the book; however, 
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there also has to be context. The entirety of 
Chapter 5, for example, is about Fisher Black, one 
of the thinkers who created and profited from the 
model we use today to price derivatives. Yet 
Weatherall elides the controversy still raging in 
economic circles over whether Black was 
indirectly responsible for one of the largest 
financial collapses in history, which nearly 
brought down the entire derivatives market.
1
   
 
Weatherall’s formula of giving biographical 
information of the physicists he chooses makes 
for an interesting read, but most of that 
information covers only favorable fragments of 
the character’s career; it does not present a holistic 
view of the physicists’ work or negative social 
implications of their respective ideas.   
 
SPACE & DEFENSE DEVOTEES AND THE 
PHYSICS OF WALL STREET 
  
The salient reason why this book matters 
for Space and Defense is that some of the ideas 
shaping contemporary physics and finance are 
pertinent to contemporary defense thinking. When 
Weatherall covers Mandelbrot, the reader quickly 
realizes the monumental shift Mandelbrot the 
individual brought to our collective understanding 
of the world in which we live.   
 
Essentially Mandelbrot proved our world is much 
more volatile and less stable than we choose to 
believe, even after we see data definitively 
indicating its volatility. Tremendous price 
movements, for example, happen much more 
frequently than expected, just as extreme events in 
general happen more frequently (in the fat tails of 
a non-normal distribution). This finding is 
sobering to those equipped with a mere bell curve, 
attempting to defend not only financial order but a 
peaceful and just world order. The Physics of Wall 
Street, then, is an introduction to thinking anew 
about innovation, risk, and predicting what may 
happen in Nature, whether physical, economic, or 
social.  
  
Toward the end of his biographies, Weatherall 
introduces the reader to a little-celebrated 
physicist named Didier Sornette and showcases 
                                                          
1
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Sornette’s groundbreaking theories on log-
periodic predictions.
2
 Weatherall deftly explains 
how Sornette’s model predicted the 2008 financial 
crisis as a culmination of precursors, relatively 
tiny cracks in the system.  
 
With this account, Weatherall offers policy 
makers a realistic hope that humanity can predict 
catastrophic events, which any policy maker 
concerned with national defense in an 
international system of states must consider. 
Perhaps some extreme events so frequent in 
Mandelbrot’s model may be accurately predicted 
in a timely manner by Sornette’s approach. If so, 
this would raise the bar on what policy makers 
may do in mitigating or preventing catastrophic 
events from happening in the first place. 
  
Weatherall’s book stands on the thesis that 
significant real world events are more predictable 
than they appear. This opposes conventional 
wisdom for many concerned with space and 
defense. Our standard notions hew closer to the 
black swan theory popularized in Pentagon circles 
by Nassim Taleb.
3
 Taleb warns that black swan 
events will at some point upend the world, and 
there is no way to head them off.  
 
While it seems unlikely that all catastrophic 
events will ever be predicted accurately, 
Weatherall, contra Taleb, urges it is worthwhile to 
attempt to model these outcomes and to test 
models by investing precious resources Taleb 
would hold in reserve. In this sense, Weatheralls’ 
book gives a refreshing rebuttal against darkness 
and paralysis induced by black swans. Defiant to 
the end, Weatherall parades real-life example after 
example of problem-solvers who did not tarry but 
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